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DEMOCRATIC RENEWAL AND THE CIVIL
JURY
Richard L. Jolly,* Valerie P. Hans,† & Robert S. Peck‡
The United States is in a period of democratic decline.
Waning commitment to principles of self-governance
throughout the polity necessitates urgent action to revitalize the
Republic. The civil jury offers an often-overlooked avenue for
such democratic renewal. Welcoming laypeople into the
courthouse and deputizing them as constitutional actors
demonstrates a profound faith in representative governance
and results in wide-reaching and pronounced sociopolitical
and administrative benefits. The Seventh Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution and similar state provisions protect the
rights of litigants to jury trials in most circumstances. But these
promises have been hollowed over time through legal, political,
and practical challenges. The result is that civil juries play a
more minor role in resolving civil disputes today than at any
other point in American history. If the civil jury is to serve as a
locus of democratic power and as an emboldening civic
experience for those who serve, it too must be renewed. To this
end, this Article offers six research-based recommendations,
informed by the distinctive approach that jurors bring to
decision-making as well as the sociopolitical benefits that
undergird the institution. Adopting these strategies can help
reintroduce democracy into the civil justice system, and in
doing so, can help direct America back toward the nation’s
democratic aspirations.

* Associate Professor of Law, Southwestern Law School.
† Charles F. Rechlin Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
‡ President of the Center for Constitutional Litigation, P.C. This article draws on our white
paper, written for the Civil Justice Research Initiative at the University of California,
Berkeley, School of Law. The authors thank Anne Bloom, Erwin Chemerinsky, Kevin
Clermont, and Alexandra Lahav for their extraordinarily helpful comments on early drafts.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States is in a period of crisis. At the time of this
writing, COVID-19 has claimed the lives of over a million people
and hospitalized over four million.1 The sickness has upended every
aspect of the nation’s social, economic, and government institutions,
and, with new variants regularly emerging, there seems to be little
sign of abatement.2 The dominant political parties, which were
deeply polarized even before the pandemic, have grown only more
so.3 And opportunistic public figures have used the emergency to
foment a loss of faith in the nation’s institutions with shocking
effectiveness.4 A Harvard study found that a plurality of young
Americans today believe that American democracy is “in trouble” or
“failing,” with a third believing that the country is on a path to civil
war.5 But perhaps the darkest indicator of democratic malaise
occurred on January 6, 2021, when a violent mob stormed the
Capitol in an attempt to prevent the peaceful transfer of political
These figures were cited by the Supreme Court on January 13, 2022. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep.
Bus. v. Dep’t of Labor, OSHA, 142 S. Ct. 661, 670 (2022) (Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ.,
dissenting); see also Coronavirus in the U.S.: Latest Map and Case Count, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
5, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/us/covid-cases.html (reporting 1,029,108
total deaths due to COVID-19).
2 See Kathy Katella, Omicron, Delta, Alpha, and More: What to Know About the
Coronavirus Variants, YALE MED. (Aug. 31, 2022), https://www.yalemedicine.org/news/covid19-variants-of-concern-omicron (“One thing we know for sure about SARS-CoV-2, the virus
that causes COVID-19, is that it is changing constantly.”).
3 See, e.g., Political Polarization in the American Public, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 12, 2014),
https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-americanpublic/ (offering empirical evidence of increasing partisan polarization in the United States
from 1994 through 2014); see also, e.g., Michael Dimock & Richard Wike, America is
Exceptional in the Nature of its Political Divide, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 13, 2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/11/13/america-is-exceptional-in-the-nature-ofits-political-divide/ (noting that “the 2020 pandemic has revealed how pervasive the divide in
American politics is relative to other nations” and claiming that “Americans have rarely been
as polarized as they are today”).
4 Cf. Toplines and Crosstabs December 2021 National Poll: Presidential Election & Jan 6th
Insurrection at the US Capitol, U. MASS. AMHERST (Dec. 28, 2021),
https://polsci.umass.edu/toplines-and-crosstabs-december-2021-national-poll-presidentialelection-jan-6th-insurrection-us (finding that a substantial number of Republicans doubt the
legitimacy of the 2020 presidential election).
5 See HARVARD KENNEDY SCH. INST. POL., HARVARD YOUTH POLL FALL 2021: TOP TRENDS
AND TAKEAWAYS (42d ed. 2021) (concluding that “[a] majority (52%) of young Americans
believe that our democracy is either ‘in trouble’ or ‘failing’” and that “[y]oung Americans place
the chances that they will see a second civil war in their lifetime at 35%”).
1
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power at the federal level for the first time in the nation’s history.6
It is said without hyperbole that the flame of American democracy
is rapidly extinguishing.7
Given the depth and severity of the Republic’s current crisis, the
civil jury might not be the first solution to come to mind as a
potential democratic corrective. The institution is regularly
relegated in popular and constitutional discussions to being little
more than an optional dispute resolution tool, with some
disparaging it as a poor one at that.8 It is rarely spoken about
broadly in terms of its sociopolitical significance and the role it plays
in enabling democratic participation and a commitment to
representative governance. But what critics of the civil jury fail to
appreciate is that the institution is an integral piece of the
constitutional puzzle that, along with other reforms, may help
America forge a path toward democratic renewal.9 As political and
social leaders search for institutional and legislative reforms to
address the nation’s current legitimacy crisis, the civil jury should
be high on their shortlist.
It is easy to forget that in early American history the right to trial
by civil jury was widely celebrated as among the most cherished
constitutional protections. Indeed, commitment to the institution
served as a chief motivator in prompting the American Revolution
and in debating and achieving the Constitution’s ratification. Recall
that British efforts to restrain colonial civil juries through enacted
legislation motivated not only the First Congress of the American
Colonies in 1765,10 but was also explicitly listed in the Declaration
6 See Kat Lonsdorf, Courtney Dorning, Amy Isackson, Mary Louise Kelly & Ailsa Change,
A Timeline of How the Jan. 6 Attack Unfolded—Including Who Said What and When, NPR,
(June 9, 2022, 9:11 AM) https://www.npr.org/2022/01/05/1069977469/a-timeline-of-how-thejan-6-attack-unfolded-including-who-said-what-and-when (documenting the January 6,
2021, Capitol riots’ timeline).
7 See SARAH REPUCCI, FROM CRISIS TO REFORM: A CALL TO STRENGTHEN AMERICA’S
BATTERED DEMOCRACY (Freedom House 2022), https://freedomhouse.org/report/specialreport/2021/crisis-reform-call-strengthen-americas-battered-democracy (noting the United
States’ rapid democratic decline in relation to established democracies around the world).
8 See infra Section III.B.
9 See infra Part II.
10 See RESOLUTION VII OF THE STAMP ACT CONGRESS (1765) (listing among grievances
“[t]hat trial by jury is the inherent and invaluable right of every British subject in these
colonies” and “[t]hat the late Act of Parliament, . . . by extending the jurisdiction of the courts
of Admiralty beyond its ancient limits, have a manifest tendency to subvert the rights and
liberties of the colonists”).
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of Independence as a grievance justifying the Revolution.11 And
roughly a decade later, ratification of the United States
Constitution was in no small part secured by a promise to guarantee
civil jury protections as part of a subsequent Bill of Rights,12 which
was realized in 1791 with the Seventh Amendment.13
Furthermore, the civil jury has never been merely a feature of
the federal government. The constitutions of all thirteen original
states secured the institution—in fact, the civil jury was likely the
only right so universally protected at the Founding.14 When the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified roughly a century later, the
constitutions of thirty-six out of thirty-seven states guaranteed the
right to a jury trial.15 And today, Colorado, Louisiana, and Wyoming
are the only states without civil jury guarantees in their
constitutions, though all three protect the right by legislation in
certain contexts.16 Furthermore, this broad protection is in some
sense uniquely American. Though England was the progenitor of
common law civil juries, the country abandoned their widespread
use after the First World War.17 And while lay participation in
resolving disputes has recently expanded in some countries—

See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (U.S. 1776) (“For depriving us in many
cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury”).
12 See Stanton D. Krauss, The Original Understanding of the Seventh Amendment Right to
Jury Trial, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 407, 411–13 (1999) (outlining how one of the most potent
arguments against the ratification of the Constitution was “[t]he absence of a guarantee that
litigants would have a right to jury trial in civil cases in any new federal courts” and “[o]nly
by promising amendments did the Federalists prevail”).
13 See U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by
a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to
the rules of the common law.”).
14 See LEONARD LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY
AMERICAN HISTORY 281 (1960) (“The right to trial by jury was probably the only one
universally secured by the first American state Constitutions . . . .”).
15 See Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under State Constitutions
When the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868, 87 TEX. L. REV. 7, 115 (2008)
(surveying the adoption of jury trial rights in state constitutions at the time of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s ratification).
16 See Eric J. Hamilton, Note, Federalism and the State Civil Jury Rights, 65 STAN. L. REV.
851, 858–59 (2013) (reviewing state practices and protections as to civil jury rights).
17 See William V. Dorsaneo, III, The Decline of Anglo-American Civil Jury Trial Practice,
71 SMU L. REV. 353, 355–56 (2018) (noting that the civil jury began in England around the
end of the 1100s before it all but disappeared in the 1900s).
11
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perhaps most successfully in Argentina18—no other countries
protect the right to trial by civil jury as widely and as foundationally
as the United States does.
Strong political, social, and administrative motivations compel
America’s commitment to civil juries and provide guidance for
addressing the nation’s current democratic decline. By nature of its
institutional characteristics, the jury is positioned to check the
application and development of law as enacted and enforced by the
government, and to serve as a bulwark against powerful social and
economic actors.19 It is a democratic part of the Constitution’s
complex system of checks and balances, ensuring that few acts of
government affecting core private rights can be brought to bear
without passing through a body of local laypeople.20 For this reason,
jury service and voting have long been conceptually linked as forms
of meaningful political participation; in fact, as Professor Andrew
Ferguson notes, “In the hierarchy of political rights, the jury
trumped voting in importance [at the Founding].”21 And as French
thinker Alexis de Tocqueville recognized after closely studying the
early American body, “The jury is . . . above all a political
institution.”22 Even today, to serve as a juror is a political
designation: It is to be deputized as a constitutional officer worthy
of resolving private disputes.23 The civil jury is enshrined in the
Constitution specifically because of—not despite—it being a locus of
democratic power.
18 See Vanina G. Almeida, Denise C. Bakrokar, Mariana Bilinski, Natali D. Chizik, Andrés
Harfuch, Lilián Andrea Ortiz, Maria Sidonie Porterie, Aldana Romano & Shari Seidman
Diamond, The Rise of the Jury in Argentina: Evolution in Real Time, in JURIES, LAY JUDGES,
AND MIXED COURTS 25, 26, 31, 41–42 (Sanja Kutnjak Ivković, Shari Diamond, Valerie P. Hans
& Nancy S. Marder, eds., Cambridge U. Press, 2021) (discussing the recent adoption and
expansion of juries in Argentina and prospects for its implementation elsewhere in Latin
America).
19 See NANCY S. MARDER, THE JURY PROCESS 10–14 (2005) (discussing the jury’s political
role); SUJA A. THOMAS, THE MISSING AMERICAN JURY 58–62 (2016) (articulating the
relationship between the jury and the traditional branches of government).
20 See THOMAS, supra note 19, at 92 (describing the jury’s position in relation to the
traditionally recognized branches of government).
21 Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Jury as Constitutional Identity, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1105, 1119 (2014).
22 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 272 (J. P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence
trans., 1969) (1835).
23 See Ferguson, supra note 21, at 1115–34 (discussing the relationship between jury
service and constitutional identity).
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But it is not just the inherent political power that makes the
institution of interest in this time of American crisis; perhaps more
important is that through exercising this power, the jury serves as
a venue for fostering a commitment to democratic governance.
Again, looking to the early body, Tocqueville described jury service
as a virtue-enhancing exercise that impresses upon those who serve
the skills required for self-governance, noting: “[Juries] make all
men feel that they have duties toward society and that they take a
share in its government. By making men pay attention to things
other than their own affairs, they combat that individual selfishness
which is like rust in society.”24 These observations are not
anachronistic. Recent empirical studies show that individuals who
serve on civil juries to the point of issuing a final verdict tend to
view their service favorably and as a form of significant civic
engagement.25 Studies also show that civil jurors who served on
larger juries that were required to reach a unanimous decision are
significantly more likely to vote in elections after jury service than
they were before serving.26
The civil jury further provides jurors, and society more broadly,
with valuable information. Bringing the public into the courthouse
to hear a controversy and to serve as an integral part of its
resolution provides transparency that is necessarily lacking from
common forms of private dispute resolution, such as mandatory
mediation and arbitration.27 Resolving disputes publicly shines
light on social ills and provides information that voters and
policymakers may draw upon in addressing common harms.28 For a
TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 22, at 274.
See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond, What Jurors Think: Expectations and Reactions of
Citizens Who Serve as Jurors, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 282, 298–300
(Robert E. Litan ed., 1993) [hereinafter Diamond, What Jurors Think] (discussing studies on
the impact on individuals of civil jury participation).
26 See Valerie P. Hans, John Gastil & Traci Feller, Deliberative Democracy and the
American Civil Jury, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 697, 710–12 (2014) (presenting empirical
data indicating that individuals were more likely to vote after serving on a jury that required
them to reach a unanimous verdict; jurors who served in twelve-person as opposed to smaller
juries, and who sat in cases with organizational as opposed to individual defendants, also
showed a boost in subsequent voting).
27 See infra Section II.B.1.
28 See CARL T. BOGUS, WHY LAWSUITS ARE GOOD FOR AMERICA 3–5 (2001) (discussing the
impact of lawsuits in prompting societal or legislative changes); ALEXANDRA LAHAV, IN
PRAISE OF LITIGATION 1–2 (2017) (concluding that “litigation is a social good” and justifies the
24
25
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recent example of this process, consider how the #MeToo movement
gained visibility and strength by publicity surrounding high-profile
instances of sexual harassment and sexual assault.29 The litigation
and attendant publicity encouraged other victims to come forward,
which provided society a better idea of the frequency and impact of
this widespread problem.30 In this way, the public resolution of
private disputes provides a public good that benefits society as a
whole.
Emphasizing these political and social benefits is not to ignore
the direct advantages that jurors offer in the administration of civil
justice. Laypeople drawn from the community for one-off trials
enhance fact-finding by bringing their diverse viewpoints to bear on
a given dispute.31 For this reason, the jury has at times been
referred to as “the lower judicial bench” in a bicameral judiciary,
and as “the democratic branch of the judiciary power.”32 This
structural power arrangement—built into the very architecture of
American courtrooms33—has advantages over deferring to
professional judges. As repeat players, judges are likely to approach
cases in a routinized fashion and fall victim to confirmation biases.34
costs of litigation because “it enables people to promote the rule of law and affirms our citizencentered political system”).
29 See Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Arbitration Stymies Progress Towards Justice in
Employment Law: Where to, #MeToo?, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 155, 156–57 (2019) (arguing
that binding arbitration clauses have halted the social movement’s progress by denying
victims access to public courts).
30 See Mary Graw Leary, Is the #MeToo Movement for Real? Implications for Jurors’ Biases
in Sexual Assault Cases, 81 LA. L. REV. 81, 83 (2020) (reviewing how the social movement
“gained staggering momentum from a tweet and evolved into a worldwide acknowledgment
of the sexual harassment and violence that many women experience”).
31 See Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes in Jury Deliberations, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1261,
1275 (2000) (explaining that “[b]ecause the jury’s work largely depends on subjective
interpretations of evidence, a variety of perspectives will enrich jury discussions” and that
interaction among jurors from various experience levels, both limited and expansive, “will
expand the range of issues to be discussed” among jurors).
32 See Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1189 (1991)
(collecting early American sources).
33 See Jonathan D. Rosenbloom, Social Ideology as Seen Through Courtroom and
Courthouse Architecture, 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 463, 487 (1998) (discussing how the
physical division between the judge and jurors reflects social ideology).
34 English writer G.K. Chesterton captures this well: “[T]he horrible thing about all legal
officials . . . is not that they are wicked (some of them are good), not that they are stupid
(several of them are quite intelligent), it is simply that they have got used to it. Strictly they
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And jurors possess attributes that judges do not. As community
representatives, jurors are informed of societal norms from which
the unrepresentative judicial class is often detached. What is more,
unlike individual trial judges, jurors must deliberate to reach a
decision, thus allowing for robust and multifaceted consideration of
a dispute.35 These jury characteristics ensure that the law is applied
and develops in a way that is grounded in community norms.
However, while the civil jury has the potential to offer these
many sociopolitical and administrative benefits that can be of
service toward the ends of democratic renewal, they are not
currently sufficiently realized. To the contrary, over the course of
the twentieth century, the civil jury as an institution has languished
under sustained attacks from the state and powerful private actors.
The judiciary adopted procedures deliberately designed to limit the
use of and role for the civil jury by transferring power into the hands
of unrepresentative judges and private arbitrators.36 Legislatures,
too, enacted laws restricting access to the jury by allowing for
mandatory arbitration agreements, as well as limiting the jury’s
fact-finding role by restricting their authority to assess and award
civil damages in certain contexts.37 And businesses, particularly
those in the insurance industry, have engaged in a decades-long
political campaign to convince the public, practitioners, and the
judiciary that these restrictions on the civil jury are not only
warranted but also should be expanded.38 The jury, they say, is
unqualified to decide complex disputes, and that twelve laypeople
routinely bring not wisdom but prejudice against certain litigants—
specifically those with business interests.39
These attacks, fundamentally unfounded or subject to built-in
correctives, have been so effective that they have come close to
nearly eradicating the jury as a meaningful component of the

do not see the prisoner in the dock; all they see is the usual man in the usual place. They do
not see the awful court of judgment; they only see their own workshop.” G. K. Chesterton,
The Twelve Men, in TREMENDOUS TRIFLES 80, 85–86 (1909).
35 See infra Section II.B.
36 See infra Section III.A.
37 See infra Section IV.B.
38 See infra Section III.C.
39 See infra Section III.C.
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American civil justice system.40 Although at common law the civil
jury was the primary means by which legal disputes were
resolved,41 the jury today is but an afterthought. In 2019—the last
complete pre-pandemic fiscal year—juries disposed of just 0.53% of
filed federal civil disputes.42 The trend is mirrored in state courts.
Although figures are incomplete (in part because the federal
government no longer collects them), data from the Court Statistics
Project shows that in 2019, juries disposed of a median of only 0.09%
of state civil disputes.43 Hawaii reported just a single civil jury trial
that year; Alaska reported zero.44 So while ostensibly the civil jury
is secured for use in all legal disputes to ensure the democratic
application and development of law, the reality is that the
institution’s use has been drastically reduced.
The COVID-19 pandemic poses a new threat to the civil jury,
with the potential to topple the institution entirely. From the
beginning of the outbreak, it was clear that the airborne spread of
the disease posed unique challenges to the jury, which, as a
deliberative body, traditionally requires some degree of
interpersonal interaction. As a result, in the spring of 2020, many
courts around the country responded by completely suspending civil

40 While our analysis focuses on the civil jury, it must be noted that the criminal jury, too,
has been diminished as a locus of democratic power. See THOMAS, supra note 19, at 79 (noting
that plea bargaining is one of the primary reasons “for the decline of criminal jury trials”). As
the Supreme Court has recognized, American criminal justice today is for the most part “a
system of pleas, not a system of trials.” Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 169–70 (2012). Like
the civil jury, this displacement of the criminal jury has had deleterious effects on the
democratic health of the Republic. See CARISSA BYRNE HESSICK, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT
TRIAL: WHY PLEA BARGAINING IS A BAD DEAL 1, 19–26, 221–22 (2021) (documenting the
decline of jury trials and the rise of guilty pleas and describing the negative consequences).
We emphasize the civil jury here, however, because its near collapse offers substantial upside
from revival, and it is most often overlooked in the conversation.
41 See Mark P. Gergen, The Jury’s Role in Deciding Normative Issues in the American
Common Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 407, 419 (1999) (explaining how juries “retained the
ultimate power to decide the great majority of cases” in colonial American courts).
42 Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Annual Report of the Director, Table C-4 (2019).
43 See Sarah Gibson, Bree Harris, Nicole Waters, Kathryn Genthon, Amanda Fisher-Boyd
& Diane Robinson, Trial Court Caseload Overview, CT. STAT. PROJECT,
https://www.courtstatistics.org/csp-stat-nav-cards-first-row/csp-stat-civil (last updated July
8, 2022) (compiling disposition data from selected state courts).
44 Id.
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jury trials.45 In Los Angeles Superior Court, for instance, all nonpreference civil trials were postponed for all of 2020.46 And some
state and federal courts took the same approach in response to the
highly-contagious Omicron variant in late 2021 and early 2022.47
Such postponements produce backlogs that will likely plague a court
system’s docket long after normal operations resume. For some civil
litigants—such as those who are elderly, injured, or ill—this delay
will operate as a complete denial of justice.48 And for others, the
lengthy delays raise the prospect of stale or faulty evidence when
their case eventually is tried.49
This near complete lack of civil trials has been a boon for the
private arbitration industry. As the American Arbitration
Association advertises on their website: “With court delays caused
by the COVID-19 pandemic, a jury trial is unlikely in the near

45 See Courts Suspending Jury Trials as COVID-19 Cases Surge, U.S. CTS. (Nov. 20, 2020),
https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2020/11/20/courts-suspending-jury-trials-covid-19-casessurge (“About two dozen U.S. district courts have posted orders that suspend jury trials or
grand jury proceedings, and scale back other courthouse activities in response to a sharp
nationwide rise in coronavirus (COVID-19) cases.”).
46 See Administrative Order of the Presiding Judge Re: COVID-19 Pandemic, Gen. Order
No. 2020-GEN-023-00 at 10 (Super. Ct. L.A. Cnty. Oct. 9, 2020) (“All non-preference civil jury
trials may commence on or after January 4, 2021.”); see also CA.CIV. PROC. CODE § 36 (giving
preference to those civil actions involving, inter alia, a party “who is over 70 years of age” or
concerning “wrongful death or personal injury”).
47 See Christine Schiffner, Omicron Spike Forces Plaintiffs Firms to Reassess Trial and
Case
Strategy,
NAT’L
L.J.
(Jan.
14,
2022),
https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2022/01/14/omicron-spike-forces-plaintiffs-firmsto-reassess-trial-and-case-strategy/ (noting that the spike in COVID-19 cases due to the
Omicron variant caused litigants to continue to face delays, “especially when it c[ame] to jury
trials”); Michael Finnegan, Federal Jury Trials Suspended in L.A. Amid Rapid COVID
Spread, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2022), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2022-0104/federal-jury-trials-suspended-omicron-coronavirus-covid (stating that the rapid spread of
COVID-19’s Omicron variant caused “[f]ederal jury trials in Los Angeles, Santa Ana[,] and
Riverside” to be suspended for a few weeks in January of 2022).
48 While many jurisdictions have procedures to give certain litigants scheduling
preference—which are meant to recognize that some elderly and very ill plaintiffs will not
survive substantial trial delays—these procedures are neither automatic nor preferred. See,
e.g., Jay P. Barron, Foxing Your Way to Trial with Statutory Preference, 61 ORANGE CNTY.
LAW. 1, 43 (2019) (reviewing the process by which parties request scheduling preference).
49 Cf. Irving R. Kaufman, Judicial Reform in the Next Century, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1976)
(noting the “pervasive extent of cost and delay, and their corrosive impact upon our judicial
system”).
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future.”50 They are not wrong. Courts are reporting that the backlog
just in criminal cases could take years to work through, let alone
the pile of hundreds of thousands of actively pending civil cases.51
Moreover, there are an unknown number of civil cases that were not
filed in 2020 because parties chose instead to wait out the
pandemic.52 The Court Statistics Project estimates this number of
“shadow cases” to be over 1.1 million for just the twelve states that
reported their 2020 caseloads, and it warns that these cases “have
the potential to overwhelm the civil justice system.”53 Factor in the
continued underfunding of the judicial branch54 and it is not
alarmist to recognize that the already rare civil jury trial is likely to
lay dormant for the foreseeable future, despite some admirable
experiments in virtual jury trials.55
Accordingly, if the sociopolitical benefits inherent in the use of
civil juries are to be realized in this time of American democratic
decline, it is necessary that the institution itself be restored.
Strategies for doing so should be motivated by the animating
principles of lay participation in resolving civil disputes—including
the democratic representation of the community and the
emboldening role of jury decision-making. Efforts must be made to
remove barriers to jury trials so that they can occur more frequently
50 The Arbitration Solution to COVID-19-Stalled Court Litigation, AM. ARB. ASS’N,
https://www.adr.org/litigation-to-arbitration (last visited Nov. 10, 2022).
51 See DIANE ROBINSON & SARAH GIBSON, PANDEMIC CASELOAD HIGHLIGHTS, CT. STAT.
PROJECT,
(Mar.
22,
2021),
https://www.courtstatistics.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0022/61519/2020_4Q_pandemic.pdf
(citing data showing the staggering amount of pending criminal and civil cases in 2020).
52 See id. (“Although courts remained open for filing throughout the pandemic, litigants . . .
may simply have chosen to wait to file civil or domestic relations cases.”).
53 Id.
54 See Mandi Hunter, Who Pays if Kansas Doesn’t Fund Its Court System Adequately? You,
Eventually,
THE
KAN.
CITY
STAR
(Apr.
30,
2021),
https://www.kansascity.com/opinion/readersopinion/guestcommentary/article251037774.ht
ml (noting that Kansas state courts “have not been adequately funded for years”); Tom
Coulter, Officials: Budget Cuts Likely to Have Effects on Court System, RAWLINS TIMES (Oct.
13, 2020), wyomingnews.com/rawlinstimes/news/officials-budget-cuts-likely-to-have-effectson-court-system/article_924174e7-4a35-521c-89f6-36da8f278fef.html (explaining that the
cuts in funding will result in a decrease in trials).
55
See
Coronavirus
and
the
Courts,
NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS.,
https://www.ncsc.org/newsroom/public-health-emergency (last visited Aug. 7, 2022)
(providing links to state court experiments with virtual jury trials); see generally ONLINE
COURTROOM PROJECT, https://www.onlinecourtroom.org/ (last visited Aug. 7, 2022)
(describing efforts by trial consultants and others to study and improve online trials).
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and to improve the fairness and accuracy of jury fact-finding so that
more litigants view jury trials as a desirable mode of dispute
resolution. We offer here six research-based strategies aimed at
making these changes. Adopting these strategies can help rebuild
the civil jury so that it is once again a key component of our
democracy.
This Article recognizes that the jury represents a profound
commitment to the principles of democratic self-governance and
contends that looking to the institution can help guide the nation
back toward those principles. To this end, it is divided into three
main parts. Part II recounts the history and the anticipated role of
the civil jury within the constitutional structure. It emphasizes that
bringing the community into the application and development of the
law has pronounced administrative and sociopolitical benefits. Part
III presents the history of the institution’s decline in use and esteem
over the twentieth century. It recounts how critiques and successful
attacks on jury authority have created a culture that views the
institution as expendable. Part IV contends that if the democracyenhancing benefits associated with the civil jury are to be once again
realized, strategies must be taken to restore the institution to its
position as a core part of the constitutional body. It offers strategies
empirically shown to remove barriers to, and to improve the fairness
and accuracy of, civil jury trials. The Article concludes that while
the civil jury is unlikely to alone renew American democracy, it
must be part of the conversation.

II. THE FOUNDATIONAL BENEFITS OF TRIAL BY CIVIL JURY
To understand the sociopolitical benefits that restoring the civil
jury can bring in this time of democratic crisis, it is helpful to
examine the role the institution played at the time of the Founding.
The civil jury was cemented in the U.S. Constitution and widely
protected in the states as a core institution designed to check abuses
of power by the government and powerful actors.56 It was a
democratic body, bringing laypeople into the administration of
56 See Eric Fleisig-Greene, Why Contempt Is Different: Agency Costs and Petty Crime in
Summary Contempt Proceedings, 112 YALE L.J. 1223, 1229 (2003) (suggesting that the
Founders included the right to a jury trial, at least in part, because of “the functional role of
the jury as a way to assure that the judiciary remained accountable to, and aligned with, the
interests of the citizenry it purported to serve”).
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justice and allowing them to exercise meaningfully the practice of
self-governance. These are not theoretical benefits. Modern
empirical research shows that jury service supports these
foundational interests.57 The jury enhances the administration of
justice by democratizing the process of fact-finding and ensuring
that outcomes conform with communitarian notions of justice. And
through that civic engagement and transparency, laypeople are
imbued with a deeper commitment to the legitimacy of government
institutions.
A. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF THE CIVIL JURY

It is difficult to overstate the role that the civil jury played in the
run-up to the American Revolutionary War and the founding of the
United States. The jury at the time was a core channel through
which the colonists challenged the distant and unrepresentative
monarchy.58 In establishing their new system of government, many
former colonists insisted that these jury protections be preserved in
writing to act as a similar bulwark against the proposed American
federal government.59 To this end, the civil jury was
constitutionalized not merely as a dispute resolution tool but also
as a democratic body meant to bind the hands of powerful actors to
the mast of the community.60 It was an integral, structural
component of the constitutional system itself.
57 See, e.g., Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253,
1278–94 (2009) (describing one of the jury’s roles as a “deliberative accountability paradigm”).
58 In fact, colonial America was familiar with the resistance that criminal juries showed to
the Crown not only in criminal prosecutions like Zenger’s trial or the trial of William Penn,
but also in civil cases that held British officials accountable for overstepping their authority
and restricting civil liberties through damage verdicts, as in Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng.
Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765) and Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B. 1763).
59 See, e.g., United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510–11 (1995) (recognizing that juries
were “designed ‘to guard against a spirit of oppression and tyranny on the part of rulers,’ and
were ‘from very early times insisted on by our ancestors in the parent country, as the great
bulwark of their civil and political liberties.’” (quoting 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 540–41 (4th ed. 1873))).
60 See J. H. Michael Jr., Right to Trial by Jury: How Important?, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. OFF.,
OF JUST. PROGRAMS (Oct. 1991), https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/righttrial-jury-how-important (listing “the vindication of interests of private citizens in litigation
with the government” and “protection of litigants against overbearing and oppressive judges”
as arguments in favor of civil jury trials that were advanced during the Constitution’s
ratification process).
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It is unsurprising that the Founders so entrusted the jury.
Eighteenth-century jurists and scholars revered the jury for its
sociopolitical significance. Perhaps most famous among these
champions was English jurist William Blackstone. In his widely
circulated Commentaries,61 Blackstone celebrated the jury with an
almost religious zeal. He called it “the glory of English law,” “a
privilege of the highest and most beneficial nature,” and “the
principal bulwark of [every Englishman’s] liberties.”62 It was, he
said, a “strong and two-fold barrier . . . between the liberties of the
people[] and the prerogative of the crown” because “the truth of
every accusation . . . [s]hould afterwards be confirmed by the
unanimous suffrage of twelve of [a defendant’s] equals and
neighbours, indifferently chosen, and superior to all suspicion.”63
It was this politically active jury that the American colonists
weaponized in the decades leading up to the Revolution. Relying not
just on colonial assemblies that opposed British tyranny, juries
served “to protect the rights of the people from being violated by the
Crown and its dependents,” as a representative institution.64 One of
the early and most famous examples of the colonists exerting such
political power is the seditious libel case of John Peter Zenger in
1735. Zenger was accused of printing allegations of corruption
against the New York Governor, including the governor’s attempt
to recover a debt in an equity court to evade the debtor’s right to a
jury trial.65 At the trial, because it was agreed that Zenger had
published the material, his attorney Andrew Hamilton argued in
support of the jury’s power to determine both law and fact and to
acquit Zenger on the basis that the corruption allegations were
truthful, despite the fact that truth was not a defense for libel under

61 The Supreme Court has recognized that “[a]t the time of the adoption of the Federal
Constitution, [Blackstone’s Commentaries] had been published about twenty years, and it
has been said that more copies of the work had been sold in this country than in England; so
that undoubtedly, the framers of the Constitution were familiar with it.” Schick v. United
States, 195 U.S. 65, 69 (1904).
62 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *350, *379 (1765).
63 Id. at *349–50.
64 Jack N. Rakove, The Original Justifications for Judicial Independence, 95 GEO. L.J.
1061, 1074 (2007).
65 See CLARK GAVIN, FAMOUS LIBEL AND SLANDER CASES OF HISTORY: FOUL, FALSE AND
INFAMOUS 45–46 (Collier Books 1962) (“Zenger was arrested . . . on a Council warrant
charging seditious libel.”).
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the law.66 Although the judge threatened Hamilton with disbarment
for making the argument and the jurors with perjury if they
returned a not guilty verdict, the jury acquitted Zenger.67 The
outcome was celebrated throughout the colonies.68
The Zenger case proved to be no outlier. By the mid-eighteenth
century, colonists were regularly employing the jury to nullify the
excesses of the Crown. They did so both offensively—for instance,
by refusing to enforce civil penalties against smugglers—and
defensively—by awarding smugglers damages for harms resulting
from the trespass of officers’ searches.69 In doing this, colonial jurors
essentially rendered British law unenforceable, so much so that one
governor complained, “[A] trial by jury here is only trying one illicit
trader by his fellows, or at least by his well-wishers.”70 Another
governor warned in 1761: “A custom house officer has no chance
with a jury, let his cause be what it will. And it will depend upon
the vigorous measures that shall be taken [in London] for the
defense of the officers, whether there be any Custom house here at
all.”71
The Crown soon took vigorous measures against the jury,
specifically by expanding the jurisdiction of juryless tribunals. This
began with the Stamp Act of 1765, which required that all printed
documents used or created in the colonies bear an embossed revenue
stamp, with violations to be tried in juryless vice-admiralty courts.72

See id. at 52–53 (reciting the hearing transcript when Hamilton stressed that a jury may
“determine both the law and the fact, and where they do not doubt of the law . . . they ought
to do so”).
67 See Arthur E. Sutherland, A Brief Narrative of the Case and Trial of John Peter Zenger,
77 HARV. L. REV. 787, 788 (1964) (noting that the jury acquitted Zenger while spectators
cheered).
68 For a review of the Zenger trial and its significance in the colonies, see generally JAMES
ALEXANDER, PRINTER OF THE NEW YORK WEEKLY JOURNAL, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE
AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER (Stanley Nider Katz ed., 1963).
69 See, e.g., Erving v. Cradock, 1 Geo. 3 (1761), in JOSIAH QUINCY, JR., REPORTS OF CASES
ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF
MASSACHUSETTS BAY, BETWEEN 1761 AND 1772 app. II at 555 (1865) (returning a verdict for
a ship owner in breach of revenue law and against a customs collector for trespass when the
collector held the plaintiff’s ship and cargo pending payment of a civil fine).
70 STEPHEN BOTEIN, EARLY AMERICAN LAW AND SOCIETY 57 (1983) (quoting Governor
William Shirley).
71 Letter from Governor Francis Bernard to Lords of Trade (Aug. 2, 1761), in QUINCY, JR.,
supra note 69, app. II at 557.
72 Duties in America (Stamp) Act 1765, 5 Geo. 3, c. 12.
66
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Over the next three years, the British passed a series of taxes known
as the Townshend Acts,73 which also placed jurisdiction beyond
juries in vice-admiralty courts.74 Since the Crown could not directly
control the obstinate colonial jurors, it took steps so that juries
would simply be avoided.
The colonists met these several Acts with fierce objections.75 The
Stamp Act, for instance, triggered the First Congress of the
American Colonies in October of 1765, where the body declared that
“trial by jury is the inherent and invaluable right of every British
subject in these colonies” and that “[the Stamp Act], and several
other acts, by extending the jurisdiction of the courts of admiralty
beyond its ancient limits, have a manifest tendency to subvert the
rights and liberties of the colonists.”76 A similar claim was made
soon thereafter in the Declaration of Independence, which
proclaimed that independence was justified in part because the
Crown had “depriv[ed] [the colonists] in many cases, of the benefits
of Trial by Jury.”77
Americans’ reverence for the jury did not diminish after the war.
Under the short-lived Articles of Confederation, Congress required
civil juries to resolve certain disputes and all thirteen states broadly
secured the institution.78 Likewise, the institution was secured in
the Northwest Territory.79 Thus, it is somewhat surprising that the
Constitution as originally drafted in 1787 only secured the right to
trial by jury for all crimes, except those of impeachment; it did not
secure civil jury protections. This absence was not because the
drafters found the civil jury an unworthy institution of such
protection or because they intended to destroy it. Instead, the
See Catherine S. Menand, The Revolutionary Moment and the Supreme Judicial Court,
77 MASS. L. REV. 22, 23 (1992) (explaining that these “acts provided for certain import taxes
and tightened existing customs regulations”).
74 Vice Admiralty Court Act 1767, 8 Geo. 3., c. 22.
75 For a review of American colonial vice-admiralty courts in the American colonies and
how changes in their jurisdiction helped spark the Revolution, see generally CARL
UBBELOHDE, THE VICE-ADMIRALTY COURTS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1960).
76 RESOLUTIONS VII, VIII OF THE STAMP ACT CONGRESS (1765).
77 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (U.S. 1776).
78 See Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57
MINN. L. REV. 639, 655 (1972) (discussing the broad protection the civil jury enjoyed).
79 See NORTHWEST ORDINANCE OF 1787 art. II (“The inhabitants of the said territory shall
always be entitled to the benefits of . . . the trial by jury”); see also SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES
387 (Richard L. Perry ed., 1978) (noting that “the Northwest Ordinance contains the first
federally enacted bill of rights”).
73
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drafters found it difficult to find language that would correspond
with the different civil jury practices in the states and believed the
right to be so ingrained that those in power would have no incentive
to restrict it.80
Nevertheless, the initial lack of civil jury protections in the
Constitution was met with great skepticism throughout the states.
As Alexander Hamilton acknowledged, “The objection to the
[Constitution], which has met with most success[,] . . . is that
relative to the want of a constitutional provision for the trial by jury
in civil cases.”81 Anti-Federalists persuasively charged that the
original Constitution’s grant of the Supreme Court appellate
jurisdiction both “as to law and fact” effectively abolished civil juries
altogether.82 They wrote passionately on the horrors that would
result if civil jury protections were not constitutionalized: “[W]hat
satisfaction can we expect from a lordly court of justice, always
ready to protect the officers of government against the weak and
helpless citizen, and who will perhaps sit at the distance of many
hundred miles from the place where the outrage was committed?”83
The civil jury, then, provided protection not only against
executive abuses of power, but also against those judges who might
bless such abuses. As the Federal Farmer, a prolific Anti-Federalist,
expounded: “[F]requently drawn from the body of the people . . . we
secure to the people at large, their just and rightful control in the
judicial department.”84 And Thomas Jefferson, a reluctant
supporter of the Constitution, went so far as to answer: “Were I
80 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 83 (Alexander Hamilton) (“From this sketch it appears that
there is a material diversity, as well in the modification as in the extent of the institution of
trial by jury in civil cases, in the several States; and from this fact these obvious reflections
flow: first, that no general rule could have been fixed upon by the convention which would
have corresponded with the circumstances of all the States; and secondly, that more or at
least as much might have been hazarded by taking the system of any one State for a standard,
as by omitting a provision altogether and leaving the matter, as has been done, to legislative
regulation.”).
81 Id.
82 See, e.g., ESSAY OF A DEMOCRATIC FEDERALIST (1787), reprinted in 3 THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIST 58, 60 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (discussing that appellate jurisdiction
of the supreme court “precludes every idea of a trial by jury”).
83 Id.; see also AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
87 (1998) [hereinafter AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS] (providing “graphic[] illustrat[ions]” of
cases where English “judges had at times abetted government tyranny”).
84 LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER XV (1788), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST, 315, 320 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
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called upon to decide, whether the people had best be omitted in the
legislative or judiciary department, I would say it is better to leave
them out of the legislative. The execution of the laws is more
important than the making [of] them.”85 He continued, highlighting
distrust of a permanent judiciary, noting that such “judges acquire
an Esprit de corps,” and are liable to be misled “by a spirit of party”
or “by a devotion to the executive or legislative power.”86 “It is in the
power, therefore, of the juries, if they think permanent judges are
under any bias whatever, in any cause,” Jefferson said, “to take on
themselves to judge the law as well as the fact.”87
Finally, the civil jury—and particularly the importance of
constitutionalizing it—was thought to be necessary to guard against
the national legislature, which might pass obnoxious and unpopular
legislation, or even worse, seek to restrict the use of juries in cases
arising under such legislation.88 So celebrated was the right to a
civil jury that some Federalists’ response to this argument was that
reasonable legislators would dare not restrict the right out of their
own self-interest.89 Prior to serving as one of the nation’s first
Supreme Court Justices, James Iredell earnestly contended that if
jury protections were stripped, “[Congress’s] authority would be
instantly resisted,” drawing upon the legislators “the resentment
and detestation of the people” such that “[t]hey and their families
. . . would be held in eternal infamy.”90 But it was precisely because
legislators could not be trusted to draw the contours of significant

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to M. L’Abbe Arnond (July 19, 1789), in 3 THE WRITINGS
THOMAS JEFFERSON: BEING HIS AUTOBIOGRAPHY, CORRESPONDENCE, REPORTS,
MESSAGES, ADDRESSES, AND OTHER WRITINGS, OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE 82 (H. A. Washington,
ed., 1853).
86 Id. at 81.
87 Id. at 82.
88 See Wolfram, supra note 78, at 654 (“A deeply divisive issue in the years just preceding
the outbreak of hostilities between the colonies and England in 1774–1776 had been the
extent to which colonial administrators were making use of judge-tried cases to circumvent
the right of civil jury trial.”).
89 See id. at 664–65 (discussing the Federalists’ position that the right to a jury trial was
better left to Congress based on the assumption that “decent men would be elected”).
90 James Iredell in the North Carolina Ratifying Convention (July 28, 1788), in 4 DEBATES
IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS
RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787 120, 148 (Jonathan
Elliot ed., 1891).
85
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rights that amendments were thought necessary to the proposed
Constitution—the civil jury being chief among them.91
The Anti-Federalists’ arguments “struck a very responsive chord”
among the American populace, who had in no small part just fought
a bloody revolution over the importance of civil jury protections.92
As part of the ratification process, eight of the nine states that
submitted amendment proposals offered specific language for
securing a civil jury right.93 Massachusetts explicitly conditioned its
ratification on the addition of such a clause.94 Accordingly, it was
the promise of what would come to be the Seventh Amendment that
convinced many skeptics to sign on to the American experiment.
Without such an implicit agreement on civil jury protections, the
U.S. Constitution may very well never have been ratified.95
As this historical account demonstrates, the civil jury at the
Founding was anticipated to be more than just one adjudicative
body among many for resolving private disputes. It was instead
established as a necessary institution within the constitutionally
established balance of power, responsible for integrating laypeople
into the administration of justice and for checking abuses of power
at various levels. Constitutional scholar Professor Akhil Amar goes
so far as to suggest: “If we seek a paradigmatic image underlying
the original Bill of Rights, we cannot go far wrong in picking the
jury.”96 The jury was the lynchpin tying the experiment together;
empowering laypeople to serve as the nation’s true sovereigns in the
administration of law.
91 Cf. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 308 (2004) (noting that, in the criminal context,
“the Framers put a jury-trial guarantee in the Constitution [because] they were unwilling to
trust government to mark out the role of the jury”).
92 Wolfram, supra note 78, at 668.
93 See Lochlan F. Shelfer, How the Constitution Shall Not Be Construed, 2017 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 331, 353 (2017) (noting that the civil jury proposal was the second most popular proposal
behind the reservation of power to the states).
94 See Edith Guild Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 289, 298 (1966) (explaining that it was necessary for Massachusetts to “recommend
certain ‘conciliatory propositions’” to achieve a majority, which included civil jury trials).
95 See Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. 433, 446 (1830) (“One of the strongest objections
originally taken against the [C]onstitution of the United States[] was the want of an express
provision securing the right of trial by jury in civil cases. As soon as the constitution was
adopted, this right was secured by the [S]eventh [A]mendment . . . [that] received an assent
of the people so general[] as to establish its importance as a fundamental guarantee of the
rights and liberties of the people.”).
96 AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 83, at 96.
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B. THE SOCIOPOLITICAL BENEFITS OF THE JURY IN PRACTICE

Our overview of the jury’s beginnings identifies important
systemic justifications for the civil jury. But it is important to note
that these benefits are not merely theoretical. Over the last sixty
years, researchers have examined how the civil jury operates in
practice. We summarize the empirical evidence on two main
dimensions: (1) the civil jury’s competence in fact-finding as
compared to that of a professional judge, and (2) the civil jury’s
impact on civic engagement of the citizenry and its contributions to
the transparency and legitimacy of the legal system. This
contemporary empirical evidence about the operation and the
impact of civil juries confirms many of the Founders’ assumptions
and experiences.
1. The Civil Jury’s Fact-Finding Advantages over Judges. Civil
juries add to the quality of fact-finding in civil trials. This assertion
might surprise some readers. After all, judges are elite, legally
trained, and experienced in adjudication, whereas jurors are drawn
from all walks of life and usually have no special legal training or
experience.97 Expertise in a particular subject matter can be very
helpful in aiding decision-making, especially in complex trials.98
Jurors’ diverse backgrounds and perspectives, and even their lack
of experience, however, offer numerous benefits in terms of quality
fact-finding—particularly in comparison to that of a professional
judge.99 By bringing their democratic insights to bear, the civil jury
enhances the work of the judicial department.
A lay citizen’s lack of specialized knowledge and experience
confers some benefits even over an experienced and expert judge.

97 Special juries, in which individuals are selected for specific education, training, or
experience to serve as civil jurors, remain an option in the United States, but their usage has
declined dramatically in recent years. See generally JAMES OLDHAM, TRIAL BY JURY: THE
SEVENTH AMENDMENT AND ANGLO-AMERICAN SPECIAL JURIES 174–212 (2006) (reviewing the
history of special juries in the United States).
98 See Valerie P. Hans, David H. Kaye, B. Michael Dann, Erin J. Farley & Stephanie
Albertson, Science in the Jury Box: Jurors’ Comprehension of Mitochondrial DNA Evidence,
35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 60, 69 (2011) (showing that jurors with more education and more
science courses do better on DNA quizzes).
99 See Taylor-Thompson, supra note 31, at 1275 (explaining that “[b]ecause the jury’s work
largely depends on subjective interpretations of evidence, a variety of perspectives will enrich
jury discussions’“ and that interaction among jurors from various experience levels, both
limited and expansive, “will expand the range of issues to be discussed” among jurors).
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Judges are repeat players; a jury decides one case at a time. As
judges sit in case after case over the years, judicial fact-finding
becomes routinized.100 Judges may jump to premature conclusions
because of similar fact patterns in prior cases, might regularly favor
one party over the other, or might even become jaded about the
process of civil litigation.101 Judges may be affected by confirmation
bias, the unconscious psychological process in which people look for
evidence that confirms their previous views and experiences and
interpret evidence in ways that are consistent with their existing
views.102 This is especially so when prior cases are presented by the
same legal counsel. Despite differences in facts and even trial
strategy, the presence of the same advocate or even the same
opponents can cause the judge to view the case with expectations
based on prior experience.103 Because lawyers often regularly
appear in a single jurisdiction, this can occur with surprising
frequency, particularly when both lawyers practice in a specialized
field. Jurors deciding a single case come with a fresh perspective.
Relatedly, judges’ personal characteristics and their prior legal
work experiences correlate with their decisions.104 For example,
studies show that judges who worked in corporate law or as
See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Judging the Judiciary by the Numbers:
Empirical Research on Judges, 13 ANN. REV. L & SOC. SCI. 203, 216 (2017) (“[E]xperience
might induce judges to adopt mental shortcuts that they did not use when they were new
judges.”).
101 Id.; see also supra note 34 and accompanying text.
102 JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & VALERIE P. HANS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TORT LAW 80–81,
212 (2016).
103 See Melissa L. Breger, Making the Invisible Visible: Exploring Implicit Bias, Judicial
Diversity and the Bench Trial, 53 U. RICH. L. REV. 1039, 1041–42 (2019) (“[E]ven if judges
attempt to shield their decisions from their explicit biases, implicit biases may seep into
judicial decision making . . . [, which] could be particularly consequential in trial courts when
juries are not utilized, or when the same litigants appear before the same judges repeatedly.”);
Jordan M. Singer, Gossiping About Judges, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 427, 435, 468 (2015)
(finding repeated appearances create an overall advantage for lawyers but that judges often
recall conduct of attorneys from previous interactions in future interactions); Bahaar
Hamzehzadeh, Repeat Player v. One-Shotter: Is Victory All that Obvious, 6 HASTINGS BUS.
L.J. 239, 243–44 (2010) (analyzing the impact on success caused by repeated appearances
before the same judge).
104 See JOANNA SHEPHERD, JOBS, JUDGES, AND JUSTICE: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
PROFESSIONAL
DIVERSITY
AND
JUDICIAL
DECISIONS
12–16
(2021),
https://demandjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Jobs-Judges-and-Justice-Shepherd-308-21.pdf (presenting data showing that “certain types of career experiences are associated
with judges favoring individuals over corporations, or vice versa”).
100
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prosecutors before becoming judges are less likely to favor
employees in employment discrimination cases.105 There is also a
link between campaign contributions and judges’ decisions.106 The
same is true for a judge’s race and political affiliation.107 Senator
Sheldon Whitehouse points to the increasing politicization of
judicial appointments and special interest funding in judicial
elections as causes for concern, both of which underscore the value
of having an effective and efficient civil jury trial option.108
True, judges operate within a laudable system of accountability.
Their judgments and written opinions are part of the public record,
are reviewed by appellate courts, and may be considered in
retention and promotion. But some studies of judicial decisionmaking have found a downside to these consequences. Judges in
state courts facing reappointment or retention elections impose
more severe sentences or show less favorability toward capital
defendants’ appeals, according to research.109 This should not be
105 See id. at 13 (“[F]ormer prosecutors and lawyers with a corporate background are less
likely to rule in favor of claimants—individual employees or the EEOC or Department of
Labor on behalf of employees—than are judges without these backgrounds.”).
106 See Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 100, at 211 (collecting studies that show that
“donations from a political party correlate with judicial decision making” (first citing Damon
M. Cann, Justice for Sale? Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisionmaking, 7 STATE
POL. & POL’Y Q. 281, 281–97 (2007); and then citing Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd,
The Partisan Price of Justice: An Empirical Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Judicial
Decisions, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 69, 69–130 (2011))).
107 See, e.g., id. at 216–22 (“[P]ersonal characteristics of judges—their political ideology,
gender, race, and experience—affect their decisions in cases that reflect those
characteristics.”). For examples of relevant research, see generally JEFFREY A. SEGAL &
HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002)
(documenting decision-making differences in judgments by judges appointed by Republican
and Democratic presidents); Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Untangling
the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 389, 399–406 (2010) (finding that a
judge’s gender affects decisions in sex discrimination cases).
108 See Sheldon Whitehouse, Restoring the Civil Jury’s Role in the Structure of Our
Government, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1241, 1266–67 (2014) (“Concerns over corrupt influence
may not be relevant as often in our contemporary civil justice system, but as judicial
appointment becomes more politicized, and as special interest funding becomes more
influential in judicial elections, corruption, particularly in the sense meant by the Founders,
is a consideration not to be overlooked.” (footnote omitted)).
109 See, e.g., Rachlinski & Wistrich, supra note 100, at 210 (indicating that “judges facing
retention elections are less favorable to capital defendants’ efforts to overturn their
sentences” and that the effect on judge behavior extends to reappointment (first citing
Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind when
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surprising. As former California Supreme Court Justice Otto Kaus
colorfully explained: “There’s no way a judge is going to be able to
ignore the political consequences of certain decisions, especially if
he or she has to make them near election time. That would be like
ignoring a crocodile in your bathtub.”110 Jurors, as temporary agents
of the state, generally face no such professional peril from their oneoff decisions.
The jury’s beneficial fact-finding flows from its comparative
advantage over judges in community representativeness. A group of
jurors is more likely than an elite judge to represent the range of
backgrounds, experiences, views, and attitudes of the community at
large.111 A substantial body of theory and research on juror decisionmaking confirms that jurors draw on their life experiences,
attitudes, and perspectives as they assess and weigh evidence in the
trial.112 The story model of juror decision-making posits that jurors
rely on their world knowledge to interpret evidence in the case and
to develop a narrative account of what happened in the events that
led to the trial.113 Knowledge of the world varies with life
experiences. As such, demographic and attitudinal characteristics
such as gender, race, and political affiliations are associated with
distinctive decisions by jurors114 and by judges as well.115 A group of
laypeople drawn from a cross-section of the community is better able
to reflect a community’s social and political characteristics, and to

it Runs for Office? 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 247, 247–63 (2004); then citing John Blume & Theodore
Eisenberg, Judicial Politics, Death Penalty Appeals, and Case Selection: An Empirical Study,
72 S. CAL. L. REV. 465, 465–503 (1999); and then citing Joanna M. Shepherd, The Influence
of Retention Politics on Judges’ Voting, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 169, 169–203 (2009))).
110 Paul Reidinger, The Politics of Judging, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1, 1987, at 52, 58.
111 See Meghan J. Ryan, Juries and the Criminal Constitution, 65 ALA. L REV. 849, 874–77
(2014) (discussing why judges are not representative of societal standards).
112 See Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making:
The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 520–29 (1991) (contending that the “central
cognitive process in juror decision making is story construction”); see generally NEAL
FEIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME: HOW JURORS THINK AND TALK ABOUT ACCIDENTS (2000)
(exploring how jurors attribute blame for accidental injury or death).
113 Pennington & Hastie, supra note 112, at 521–23.
114 See, e.g., EDIE GREENE & BRIAN H. BORNSTEIN, DETERMINING DAMAGES: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF JURY AWARDS 79–94 (2003) (describing research showing demographic
effects on damage award decision-making).
115 See supra notes 106–107 and accompanying text.
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be better informed about community norms.116 In sum, the civil jury
is in an ideal position to incorporate the community’s views and
attitudes about responsibility and the valuation of injuries in its
legal judgments.
Research on public reactions to a police car chase video footage
that was integral to the Supreme Court’s decision in Scott v.
Harris117 offers a vivid illustration of the superior ability of a
representative community group to reflect the diverse range of
citizens’ opinions. The majority of the justices in that case asserted
after viewing the footage that “no reasonable jury” could conclude
that the car’s driver did not pose a substantial risk.118 But when
researchers surveyed the public on their perception of the footage,
their “subjects didn’t see eye to eye.”119 Specifically, “African
Americans, low-income workers, and residents of the Northeast,” as
well as “individuals who characterized themselves as liberals and
Democrats,” were all more likely to disagree with the Supreme
Court’s conclusion as to the risk posed by the driver.120 When people
assess the reasonableness of others’ actions, research confirms that
even if they are instructed to use an objective standard, they rely on
their own values.121 And when judges are asked to anticipate the
collective mind of the jury, they are likely to be influenced by their
own experiences and perspectives.122
Other benefits accrue from the group nature of jury decisionmaking. Juries engage in the process of deliberation, which offers
the opportunity to compare, contrast, and test differing evaluations
of the trial evidence. Deliberation and group decision-making are
especially robust when the jury is composed of individuals with

116 See Ryan, supra note 111, at 878–80 (discussing how juries are necessarily more
representative of their communities than are judges).
117 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
118 Id. at 380.
119 Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You Going to
Believe?: Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 841
(2009).
120 Id.
121 See Mark D. Alicke & Stephanie H. Weigel, The Reasonable Person Standard:
Psychological and Legal Perspectives, 17 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 123, 123 (2021) (noting that
there is a tendency to “rely on the self” when following a reasonable person standard).
122 See, e.g., Suja A. Thomas, The Fallacy of Dispositive Procedure, 50 B.C. L. REV. 759, 760
(2009) (“[J]udges decide dispositive motions based on their own views of the evidence, as
opposed to what a reasonable jury could find.”).
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diverse backgrounds and experiences.123 Furthermore, studies have
shown that jury deliberation is more robust when juries are
required to reach unanimous as opposed to majority decisions.124
Through the diversity of individuals and their viewpoints, a more
thorough and searching decision-making process results.
In short, a jury trial—with a professional judge presiding—
combines the multiple benefits of both lay and legally-trained
decision-makers. Professional judges possess advantages of legal
expertise and experience. And juries bring diverse perspectives, life
experiences, and a strong grounding in community norms to the
fact-finding task. Deliberation aids jurors in testing their
interpretations of evidence and in developing a sound common
account of the events leading to the lawsuit. A representative jury
is thus able to fulfill one of the major purposes of trial by jury
envisioned by the Founders—to stand in for the community in legal
fact-finding to enhance the democratic legitimacy of the judicial
department and its decisions.
Extensive research on civil jury decision-making supports the
strength of the jury not only as a democratic institution but also as
a fair and accurate fact-finder.125 Interviews and post-trial
questionnaire research confirm that the vast majority of jurors take

123 See Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making: Identifying
Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 597, 606 (2006) (reporting research that found differences in decision-making
between racially diverse and non-racially diverse groups).
124 See Shari Seidman Diamond, Mary R. Rose & Beth Murphy, Revisiting the Unanimity
Requirement: The Behavior of the Nonunanimous Civil Jury, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 201, 230
(2006) (“[T]he deliberations demonstrate that thoughtful minorities are sometimes
marginalized when the majority has the power to ignore them in reaching a verdict. Although
juries generally engage in serious and intense deliberations, jurors themselves report more
thorough and open-minded debate when they reach unanimity.”); see also Valerie P. Hans,
The Power of Twelve: The Impact of Jury Size and Unanimity on Civil Jury Decision Making,
4 DEL. L. REV. 1, 23–24 (2001) [hereinafter Hans, The Power of Twelve] (summarizing
empirical evidence of the benefits of a unanimity decision rule and a larger jury size).
125 See, e.g., HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 63–65 (1966)
(presenting research on judge-jury agreement rates); Valerie P. Hans, What’s it Worth? Jury
Damage Awards as Community Judgments, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 935, 937 (2014)
[hereinafter Hans, What’s it Worth?] (“Civil jury damage awards serve to check or endorse
private power”); see also Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge:
Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1148–55 (1992) (contrasting
perceptions of civil juries with the realities of their decision-making).
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their jury duty seriously.126 Researchers have compared the verdicts
reached by juries to judicial decisions or judicial evaluations of the
same or similar types of cases; they have also used experimental
methods to examine the decision processes in civil disputes.127
It is difficult to directly compare the outcomes of jury trials and
bench trials because litigants select which cases go to the jury and
which go to the judge.128 In judge-jury agreement studies, judges
presiding over jury trials are asked to record the jury’s verdict and
to indicate what verdict they themselves would have reached had
they been trying the case as a bench trial. Therefore, the judge and
jury assess the same case, and a comparison of the actual jury
verdict and the judge’s hypothetical verdict is more readily
attributable to the distinctive qualities of the fact-finder.129 The first
judge-jury agreement study occurred in the 1950s and revealed that
the judge agreed with the jury’s verdict in civil trials seventy-eight
percent of the time.130 Interestingly, in that study, the
disagreements between the judge and jury were symmetrical;
judges would have found for the plaintiff when the jury reached a
defense verdict in ten percent of the trials, and judges would have
found for the defendant when the jury decided the case for the
plaintiff in twelve percent of the trials.131 Subsequent studies using
a similar methodology have found comparable overall agreement

126 See Diamond, What Jurors Think, supra note 25, at 288 (asserting that “the vast
majority of jurors are motivated to do a good job”).
127 NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 19 (2007) (describing
the multiple methods used to evaluate the jury system, including “interviewing and surveying
jurors, analyzing jury verdicts, and conducting experiments to test hypotheses about jury
decision processes”); see also id. at 267–79 (presenting research findings about juror
judgments of civil liability).
128 For a thoughtful discussion of the impact of these “selection effects” (that different
streams of cases are heard by judges versus juries), see Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation
Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919, 1961–64 (2009). Differences in outcomes could
thus be attributable to case differences or to differences between judge and jury decisionmaking. See id. at 1963 (concluding, in part, that “small differences between judges’ and
juries’ treatment of cases and . . . the parties’ varying the case selection that reaches the judge
and jury” contribute to differences in outcomes).
129 Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 119,
144 (2002) (discussing the data collection methodology for judge-jury agreement studies).
130 KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 125, at 63.
131 Id. at 64. For a comparison of judge and jury verdicts, see Clermont & Eisenberg, supra
note 129, 1442–47 (analyzing data on the rate of agreement between judge and jury on
liability) and Clermont, supra note 128, at 1961–64.
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rates.132 Importantly, several judge-jury agreement studies have
found that the complexity of evidence in the case is unrelated to the
agreement rates between juries and legal experts; a relationship
would have been expected if jury incompetence led juries to choose
a different verdict.133
Studies of money damage awards in civil cases, too, offer some
reassurance.134 The civil jury is in an ideal position to determine
damage awards, which is a fact-finding function constitutionally
assigned to the jury.135 Jury damage awards reflect the community’s
assessment of the value of an injury by considering the context and
circumstances of the injury and the identities and behavior of the
parties.136 The need to examine each case’s specific facts, and the
ability to handle both the uncertainty and the intangibility of some
injuries, make the representative jury a societally appropriate
decision-maker on damages. As the Virginia Supreme Court once
noted, “[T]he law wisely leaves the assessment of damages, as a
rule, to juries, with the concession that there are no scales in which
to weigh human suffering, and no measure by which pecuniary
compensation for personal injuries can be accurately
132 Shari Seidman Diamond, Neil Vidmar, Mary Rose, Leslie Ellis & Beth Murphy, Juror
Discussions During Civil Trials: Studying an Arizona Innovation, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 67 n.108
(2003) [hereinafter Diamond et al., Juror Discussions] (finding a seventy-seven percent
agreement rate between judges and juries); Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Trial Complexity:
A Field Investigation of its Meaning and its Effects, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 29, 48 (1994)
(finding a sixty-three percent agreement).
133 See, Theodore Eisenberg, Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, Valerie P. Hans & Nicole L. Waters,
Judge-Jury Agreement in Criminal Cases: A Partial Replication of Kalven and Zeisel’s The
American Jury, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 171, 191–92 (2005) (presenting research
detailing similar judge-jury agreement across different evidentiary complexities).
134 See, e.g., VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 127, 281–320 (presenting research on
compensatory and punitive damage award decision-making by juries); Hans, What’s it
Worth?, supra note 125, at 939–41 (discussing how jury-determined damage awards for
intangible injuries display the community’s value assessment of those injuries).
135 See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2002) (“A jury’s
assessment of the extent of a plaintiff’s injury is essentially a factual determination.”);
Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 353 (1998) (“The jury are the
judges of damages.” (quoting Lord Townshend v. Hughes (1677) 86 Eng. Rep. 994, 995 (C.P.));
see also BLACKSTONE, supra note 62, at *324 (“[T]he quantum of damages . . . is a matter that
cannot be done without the intervention of the jury.”).
136 See Hans, What’s it Worth?, supra note 125, at 939 (discussing how damage awards are
often closely associated with a community’s value of the injury); Harry Kalven, Jr., The Jury,
the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 OHIO ST. L.J. 158, 160 (1958) (explaining
that a foundational premise of a jury is to evaluate the damage award on a case-by-case basis).
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ascertained.”137 The jury can draw on its collective experiences with
injuries and the resulting financial consequences as they engage in
the necessary fact-finding.138
Empirical studies show that the concrete factual details and
injuries at issue in a case regularly explain a jury’s damage award.
First, the overall severity of plaintiffs’ injuries is strongly related to
jury damage awards.139 In states that separate out economic and
noneconomic damages, the amount of economic damages is a
powerful predictor of the amount of noneconomic damages.140
Second, empirical research on jury decision-making with respect to
punitive damages reassures that the civil jury acquits itself fairly;
punitive damages are generally proportionate to compensatory
damages, suggesting that the jury often is not unduly harsh.141
Instead, as with all of the jury’s decisions, the community’s
consciousness is channeled through the institution, enhancing the
accuracy and democratic legitimacy of the judgment.
2. The Civil Jury Promotes Civic Engagement and Systemic
Legitimacy. Beyond the benefits that jurors bring in fact-finding and
the administration of civil justice, the civil jury institution and juror
experience itself promote civic engagement and broader systemic
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Arrington, 101 S.E. 415, 423 (Va. 1919), abrogated by
John Crane, Inc. v. Jones, 650 S.E.2d 851 (Va. 2007).
138 See Hans, What’s it Worth?, supra note 125, at 939, 941 (explaining how jurors’
independent evaluations combined to establish a damage award rooted in community values).
139 See Randall R. Bovbjerg, Frank A. Sloan & James F. Blumstein, Valuing Life and Limb
in Tort: Scheduling “Pain and Suffering,” 83 NW. U. L. REV. 908, 941 (1989) (summarizing
evidence showing the strong relationship between injury severity and damage awards; those
who are more severely injured generally receive higher damage awards).
140 See Herbert Kritzer, Guangya Liu & Neil Vidmar, An Exploration of “Noneconomic”
Damages in Civil Jury Awards, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 971, 1010–13 (2014) (presenting
research examining possible predictive relationships between noneconomic and economic
damages based on conditional variables).
141 See Theodore Eisenberg, Valerie P. Hans & Martin T. Wells, The Relation Between
Punitive and Compensatory Awards: Combining Extreme Data with the Mass of Awards, in
CIVIL JURIES AND CIVIL JUSTICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 105, 106–07
(Brian H. Bornstein, Richard L. Wiener, Robert F. Schopp & Steven L. Willborn eds., 2008)
(finding a strong correlation between compensatory and punitive damage awards); see also
Valerie P. Hans & Valerie F. Reyna, To Dollars from Sense: Qualitative to Quantitative
Translation in Jury Damage Awards, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 120, 142, 144 (2011)
(same). After reviewing the empirical literature, the Supreme Court found that jury
“discretion to award punitive damages has not mass-produced runaway awards,” but,
instead, “show[s] an overall restraint.” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 497, 499
(2008).
137
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legitimacy. The French political thinker Alexis de Tocqueville
trenchantly observed that the civil jury operates as an ever-open
“public school” that educates American citizens about the law
through their participation.142 He added:
The jury, and more especially the civil jury, serves to
communicate the spirit of the judges to the minds of all
the citizens; and this spirit, with the habits which
attend it, is the soundest preparation for free
institutions. . . . It invests each citizen with a kind of
magistracy; it makes them all feel the duties which they
are bound to discharge toward society; and the part
which they take in the Government.143
Studies bolster this observation. One phenomenon that has been
widely documented is the largely favorable reaction that citizens
have to the experience of jury service.144 Although many citizens
express concern about receiving a jury summons, once they
participate as jurors, they generally recognize their experience as a
positive form of civic engagement.145 In one of the largest studies,
over 8,000 jurors from sixteen federal and state courts completed
questionnaires following their jury service; sixty-three percent
reported that their view of jury service became more favorable after
serving.146 In other research, after they have served, jurors are more
apt to say that they see the courts as fair and to have more favorable
views about the justice and equity of the legal system.147

See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 22, at 274 (noting how the civil jury system educates the
public on the law and instills a shared responsibility to achieve justice).
143 Id.
144 See Diamond, What Jurors Think, supra note 25, at 298–300 (summarizing the research
documenting jurors’ favorable responses to serving and finding that “willingness to serve
again was high”).
145 See James B. Binnall, A “Meaningful” Seat at the Table: Contemplating Our Ongoing
Struggle to Access Democracy, 73 SMU L. REV. F. 35, 46 (2020) (“[J]ury service fosters a
general sense of empowerment that frequently leads to other forms of civic engagement.”).
146 JANET T. MUNSTERMAN, G. THOMAS MUNSTERMAN, BRIAN LYNCH & STEVEN D. PENROD,
NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., THE RELATIONSHIP OF JUROR FEES AND TERMS OF SERVICE TO
JURY SYSTEM PERFORMANCE 6 (1991).
147 See Diamond, What Jurors Think, supra note 25, at 286 (“The jurors [that were] studied
became more positive in their assessments of the justice and equity of the legal system
following jury service.”).
142
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Jury service is a form of civic participation, and, in this way, the
jury is a responsibility-taking institution.148 It pulls individuals
from their daily lives and assigns them the task of implementing
society’s judgments, forcing them both to express and to create
community identity through group deliberation.149 Given this
substantial task and the transformative role required of laypeople
to perform it, perhaps it should not surprise us that participating as
a juror—in either a criminal or a civil trial—boosts other forms of
citizen engagement. Professor John Gastil and his colleagues put
Tocqueville’s observation to an empirical test in a set of studies that
examined the links between jury service and voting.150 In one such
study, they obtained jury service data from seven U.S. states and
linked these records with jurors’ voting history before and after jury
service.151 Citizens who served in criminal cases and who were
infrequent voters boosted their voting after completing jury
service.152 Another study found that jurors who served on twelveperson civil juries or juries that were required to reach a unanimous
See Sherman J. Clark, The Courage of Our Convictions, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2381, 2382
(1999) (articulating the virtues reflected in the jury system and in jury service); see also
Steven I. Friedland, The Competency and Responsibility of Jurors in Deciding Cases, 85 NW.
U. L. REV. 190, 192 (1990) (describing a theory of jury responsibility in which “the jury is
conceptualized as a democratic representative of the community” that should “convey the
moral condemnation of the community in a criminal case and the range of viewpoints of the
community in a civil case”).
149 Note, too, that the jury system may relieve judges of responsibility, allowing them to
take cover behind the work of jurors. See, e.g., KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 125, at 7 (noting
that one of the “collateral advantages” of the jury system is that jurors may serve as a
“lightning rod for animosity and suspicion which otherwise might center on the more
permanent judge”).
150 See JOHN GASTIL, E. PIERRE DEESS, PHILIP J. WEISER & CINDY SIMMONS, THE JURY AND
DEMOCRACY: HOW JURY DELIBERATION PROMOTES CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND POLITICAL
PARTICIPATION 45–47 (2010) [hereinafter GASTIL ET AL., THE JURY AND DEMOCRACY] (finding
that low-frequency voters who served as jurors in a criminal case were more likely to vote in
later elections); see also John Gastil, E. Pierre Deess, Philip J. Weiser & Jordan Meade, Jury
Service and Electoral Participation: A Test of the Participation Hypothesis, 70 J. POLS. 351,
358–60 (2008) (analyzing the effect of deliberation on jurors’ likelihood to vote); John Gastil,
E. Pierre Deess & Philip J. Weiser, Civic Awakening in the Jury Room: A Test of the
Connection Between Jury Deliberation and Political Participation, 64 J. POLS. 585, 586 (2002)
(examining “the link between political participation and an institutionalized form of citizen
deliberation,” specifically inquiring into the effect of deliberation and reaching a verdict on a
jury on the likelihood of voting in subsequent elections).
151 GASTIL ET AL., THE JURY AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 150, at 45–47.
152 See id. at 45–47 (finding that for low frequency voters, “[c]riminal jurors reaching a
verdict” were 4.3% more likely to vote in a future election).
148
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decision—in other words, the traditional form of trial by jury—were
significantly more likely to vote following their service, controlling
for their pre-service voting history.153 Civil jurors who decided cases
with organizational (as opposed to individual) defendants also
showed increased voting behavior.154
What is more, the civil jury enhances systemic legitimacy more
broadly. Disputants who can discuss their differences and reach fair
and equitable resolutions through mediation or other private
settlement mechanisms may not need to resort to the courts.
Surveys have found that people often are satisfied with these
private remedies.155 But for other litigants, and for the rest of
society, the public trial—and in particular the civil jury trial—offers
several advantages. In her book, In Praise of Litigation, Professor
Alexandra Lahav identifies the multiple ways in which litigation
protects important democratic values:
Litigation helps democracy function in a number of
ways: it helps to enforce the law; it fosters transparency
by revealing information crucial to individual and
public decision-making; it promotes participation in
self-government; and it offers a form of social equality
by giving litigants equal opportunities to speak and be
heard.156
With respect to enforcement and transparency, jury trials, and
public litigation more generally, add value because they produce
information about what otherwise might be unfairly hidden
practices and procedures.157 The trial is a transparent and public
153 See Hans et al., supra note 26, at 710–12 (finding that jurors on twelve-person juries
had the “highest increase in voting” participation after service).
154 See id. (“When jurors served on cases with organizational defendants, they had an
experience that resulted in a more positive change in their voting rates . . . than did those
jurors whose cases featured only individual defendants.”).
155 See Shari Seidman Diamond & Jessica M. Salerno, Reasons for the Disappearing Jury
Trial: Perspectives from Attorneys and Judges, 81 LA. L. REV. 120, 132 (2020) (finding that
respondents “preferred [mediation] significantly to arbitration and bench trials”).
156 LAHAV, supra note 28, at 1–2.
157 See id. at 56–57 (offering a real-world example of how adversarial litigation can increase
transparency and bring vital information to light); see also Alexandra D. Lahav, The Roles of
Litigation in American Democracy, 65 EMORY L.J. 1657, 1683 (2016) (reviewing the
externalities associated with public dispute resolution, including the production of
information).
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event. Citizens observe the evidence and arguments presented by
each side. Others, potentially liable under the same circumstances,
also see the results and can take additional safety measures as a
form of self-regulation, improving their products or services and
filling gaps in our system of formal regulation.158
Litigants have their day in court; their arguments and evidence
are given in public to their peers and the state. The opportunity to
present one’s views and the chance to be heard are key elements
contributing to procedural justice, a sense that fair processes are
used to resolve a dispute.159 In turn, a sense that one has been heard
and treated fairly in a dispute resolution procedure increases the
perceived legitimacy of the procedure.160 Because it takes place in a
public forum and because there is a framework for appealing the
results, there are possibilities for error correction. Private
adjudication lacks not only the transparency of inviting the public
to decide cases and check the work of arbiters but also does not have
the same corrective potential in the form of appellate review.161
In sum, the transparent and public nature of civil jury trials,
allowing the presentation of evidence on both sides, providing
litigants the opportunity to be heard, and giving citizens the right
to decide the outcomes, operates to reinforce democratic selfgovernance. Combined with the other benefits we discuss, this
positions the civil jury as an institution of great significance during
this time of American democratic decline. The jury is poised to play
the role anticipated by the Founders—bringing laypeople into the
administration of justice, investing them in the fair and democratic
158 See, e.g., BOGUS, supra note 28, at 169 (offering examples from the automobile industry);
see also Stephan Landsman, Juries as Regulators of Last Resort, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1061, 1067 (2014) (discussing the civil jury’s role in filling in gaps in the regulatory regime).
159 See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 19–68 (1990) (examining the
positive effect of procedural justice in legal experiences on legitimacy and compliance with
the law).
160 See id. at 20 (concluding that satisfaction with court performance increases the
perception of legitimacy). From the earliest days of the Republic, the Supreme Court has
recognized the importance of that perception, opining that a legitimate system of justice
“recognizes and [s]trongly [r]ests on this great moral truth, that justice is the [s]ame whether
due from one man or a million, or from a million to one man” and enables every person “to
obtain justice without any danger of being overborne by the weight and number of their
opponents.” Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 479 (1793).
161 See, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law
Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 704–12, 754 (1999) (describing how “[a]rbitration
privatizes the creation of law”).
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application of laws, and ensuring their power to push back against
state and other powerful actors. However, as will be discussed next,
the civil jury has been under sustained attack for nearly a century,
greatly inhibiting its ability to serve its emboldening role. If the civil
jury is to help redirect America toward democratic principles, it is
necessary to understand what has caused the decline of the civil
jury and to make urgent efforts to preserve and strengthen the
institution.

III. THE PRECIPITOUS DECLINE OF THE CIVIL JURY
Despite this foundational commitment to, and the sociopolitical
and administrative benefits of, the civil jury, the institution has
fallen precipitously in use and esteem. The factors contributing to
the civil jury’s decades-long decline are numerous and interrelated.
The adoption of new procedures in the twentieth century altered the
institutional relationship between the judge and the jury,
empowering the former and divesting the latter of the authority
that existed at common law. Judges hurried this transformation
through their decisions denigrating jurors as incapable of deciding
complex disputes or too impassioned to decide them impartially.162
Similarly, powerful economic actors have engaged in a lengthy
campaign to convince the public and policy makers that jurors
should not be trusted.163 The result is a popular and judicial culture
that does not value lay participation and views it as an expendable
part of the civil justice system. Thus, when budgetary or, most
recently, public health crises arise, the civil jury is easily
sidelined.164 And as a result, the many potential sociopolitical
benefits of this institution are squandered.

162 See Douglas G. Smith, The Historical and Constitutional Contexts of Jury Reform, 25
HOFSTRA L. REV. 377, 389, 485–91 (1996) (outlining common criticisms of juries and how
judges quickly exercised greater control over civil juries under the new Rules through
mechanisms such as “special verdicts and special interrogatories, summary judgment, the
directed verdict, and the judgment notwithstanding the verdict”).
163 See Jeffrey Q. Smith & Grant R. MacQueen, Going, Going, But Not Quite Gone: Trials
Continue to Decline in Federal and State Courts. Does it Matter?, 101 JUDICATURE 26, 34,
(2017) (discussing corporate defendants’ “longstanding distrust of juries”).
164 See supra notes 45–48 and accompanying text.
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A. PROCEDURAL DIVESTING OF THE CIVIL JURY’S AUTHORITY

Despite its lofty beginnings, the civil jury has long faced a steady
drumbeat of criticism from state and economic actors, leading to
decline of both its use and constitutional esteem. To be sure, for
much of American history, the jury fell short of including all
segments of the community, and its verdicts have not been immune
to racism, sexism, and other forms of bigotry.165 But whereas the
jury at the founding was seen as a great well of community
knowledge that injected laypeople into the administration of justice,
only decades into our history jurors had become—as one judge put
it—“mere assistants of the courts, whose province it is to aid them
in the decision of disputed questions of fact.”166 This new conception,
matched with substantial changes in civil procedure in the past 100
years, has made civil jury trials exceptionally rare.167 So uncommon
are they today that at least one leading scholar has proclaimed:
“The civil jury is dead.”168
This decline is not new. Scholars have voiced concerns about the
decline of the civil jury going back at least to the late 1920s.169 Their
concerns were borne out. Starting in 1962, the year when federal
judicial statistics become most reliable, a consistent decline has
been readily apparent in the percent of civil cases disposed of by

165 For an overview of the history of jury exclusion, see Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C.
Ellsworth, White Juror Bias: An Investigation of Prejudice Against Black Defendants in the
American Courtroom, 7 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 201, 204–08 (2001); see also Donald G. Gifford
& Brian Jones, Keeping Cases from Black Juries: An Empirical Analysis of How Race, Income
Inequality, and Regional History Affect Tort Law, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 557, 560 (2016)
(discussing the roles that race and racism have played, historically and through to today, in
debates and actions taken to control civil jury power around the country).
166 Ernst v. Hudson River R.R. Co., 24 How. Pr. 97, 105 (N.Y. 1862).
167 Renée Lettow Lerner, The Uncivil Jury, Part 4: The Collapse of the Civil Jury, WASH.
POST:
DEMOCRACY
DIES
IN
DARKNESS
(May
28,
2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/28/the-uncivil-jurypart-4-the-collapse-of-the-civil-jury/ (explaining how civil procedure has “expanded the scope
of discovery” which leads to fewer parties seeking to fight until trial).
168 Id.
169 See Herbert M. Kritzer, The Trials and Tribulations of Counting “Trials,” 62 DEPAUL
L. REV. 415, 416 (2013) (identifying scholarship concerning the decline of the jury trial to date
back to the 1920s).
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jury trial.170 That rate was 5.5% in 1962; 3.7% in 1972; 2.6% in 1982;
1.9% in 1992; 1.2% in 2002; 0.81% in 2012; and just 0.31% in 2021
(the most recent year on file at time of writing).171 A similar pattern
has been experienced in state courts. In those states that kept
accurate statistics, between 1976 and 2002, civil jury trials fell
threefold from 1.8% to 0.6% in courts of general jurisdiction.172 And
the most recent data from the Court Statistics Project shows that
the COVID-19 pandemic has driven these numbers to their lowest
point ever. In 2020, for those states reporting, juries disposed of a
median of only 0.06% of filed civil disputes—with Alaska reporting
zero civil jury trials for the second year in a row.173 Simply put, civil
jury trials are today the very rare exception and not the rule.
Critically, bench trials have also been falling during this time. At
the federal level, 6% of civil cases were resolved by bench trial in
1962, versus just 0.21% in 2021.174 Indeed, since 1987 there have
been fewer bench trials than jury trials at the federal level.175 Figure
1 depicts the decline in federal bench and jury trials since 1962.

170 See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters
in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 461 (2004) (showing that the
rate of civil trials by jury in 2002 “was less than one-sixth of what it was in 1962”); see also
Kritzer, supra note 169, at 438 (“It is clear that the number of jury trials declined in many,
perhaps most, jurisdictions in the United States over the last fifty years.”).
171 Galanter, supra note 170, at 461; Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Annual
Report of the Director, Table C-4 (1962–2021) (offering the total number of cases filed and
disposed of by civil jury trial).
172 Brian J. Ostrom, Shauna Strickland & Paula Hannaford, Examining Trial Trends in
State Courts: 1976–2002, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 755, 768 (2004).
173 According to the National Center for State Courts, seventeen states reported
publishable data for total civil dispositions and jury trials in 2020: Alaska (0.0 percent),
California (0.15 percent), Florida (0.07 percent), Georgia (0.05 percent), Hawai’i (0.06
percent), Indiana (0.02 percent), Michigan (0.01 percent), Minnesota (0.06 percent), Missouri
(0.03 percent), Nevada (0.06 percent), New Jersey (0.03 percent), North Carolina (0.02
percent), Ohio (0.06 percent), Rhode Island (0.02 percent), Texas (0.08 percent), Vermont
(0.09 percent) and Wisconsin (0.05 percent). CSP STAT Civil, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS.,
(Jan. 6, 2022), https://www.courtstatistics.org/csp-stat-nav-cards-first-row/csp-stat-civil.
174 See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Annual Report of the Director, Table C-4
(1962–2021) (presenting the total number of civil cases filed and disposed of by judge and
jury); see also Marc Galanter & Angela M. Frozena, A Grin Without a Cat: The Continuing
Decline & Displacement of Trials in American Courts, 143 DÆDALUS, J. OF THE AM. ACAD. OF
ARTS & SCI. 115, 116–18 (2014) (charting and discussing this trend).
175 Galanter, supra note 170, at 461
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Figure 1: Percent of Civil Cases Resolved by Bench and
Jury Trials, U.S. District Courts, 1962–2021176

Perhaps unsurprisingly, this steady historical decline in bench
and jury trials has been associated with a modified role of trial
judges. Despite a fourfold increase in the number of civil case filings
since the 1960s, judges are conducting increasingly fewer civil trials
than ever before.177 As Figure 2 illustrates, until the mid-1980s, on
average, federal judges conducted a few dozen bench and jury trials
each year. However, the number of trials began a precipitous decline
in the mid-1980s and has not recovered. The most recent data show
an average of fewer than two jury trials and one bench trial per
judge per year.

176 Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Annual Report of the Director, Table C-4
(1962–2021); see also Galanter & Frozena, supra note 174, at 125–26 (charting and discussing
this trend). To demonstrate the clear trend, Figure 1 controls for the mass disposition of oil
refinery explosion cases in the Middle District of Louisiana in 2007 and 2008, which added
over 6,300 jury trials in 2007 and over 1,400 bench trials in 2008 that had been pending in
that district for over a decade. If these refinery cases had been included in the figure, jury
trials would have accounted for 3.8% of all federal civil cases disposed of in 2007, and bench
trials would have accounted for 1.1% of such cases in 2008. See Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts, Annual Report of the Director, Table 6.3 (2007), Table 4.1 (2008).
177 See Galanter, supra note 170, at 474 (discussing this inverse relationship).
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Figure 2: Civil Trials per Article III Judgeship, U.S.
District Courts, 1962–2021178

As Figures 1 and 2 make clear, jury trials are not being “replaced”
with bench trials. Instead, the civil trial itself is disappearing. The
system of civil justice itself is more broadly under assault.
The reasons for the civil jury’s decline are many and interrelated.
Perhaps most significantly, civil procedures adopted over the course
of the twentieth century have played a central role. Many point to
the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 as a
pivotal moment of transformation.179 The original drafters of the
rules were radically anti-jury; as one scholar recognized,
“[V]irtually everyone connected with urging uniform procedural
178 Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Annual Report of the Director, Table C-4
(1962–2021); see also Galanter & Frozena, supra note 174, at 125–26 (charting and discussing
this trend). For the reasons given in supra note 176, Figure 2 controls for cases brought in
the Middle District of Louisiana in 2007 and 2008. If those cases had been included in the
figure, the average district court judge would have conducted 12.9 jury trials in 2007 and 3.7
bench trials in 2008. See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Annual Report of the
Director, Table 6.3 (2007), Table 4.1 (2008).
179 See, e.g., Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The Revolution of 1938 and Its
Discontents, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 275, 275–76 (2008) (calling the Rules an “innovative set of
procedural rules for a court system that was just coming into its own”); John F. Preis, In
Defense of Implied Injunctive Relief in Constitutional Cases, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1,
44 (2013) (describing them as one of the “major legislative event[s] of the twentieth century”).
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rules denigrated juries.”180 Charles E. Clark (the principal architect
of the Federal Rules)181 disparaged the civil jury, claiming that it
“injected an element of rigidity—of arbitrary right—into a system
wherein general rules of convenience should prevail.”182 When
Fleming James, one of the rule committee’s assistants, whittled the
core objectives of united procedure down to just three, number two
read: “The right of jury trial should not be expanded. This method
of settling disputes is expensive, dilatory—perhaps anachronistic.
Indeed, the number of jury trials should be cut down if this can be
done so as to not jeopardize the attainment of other objectives.”183
One way the drafters accomplished this was by including a jurywaiver default rule,184 which was meant to discourage the number
of jury trials. Whereas historically a litigant would need to
affirmatively request a bench trial, the new rule required a litigant
to affirmatively request a jury trial; failure to do so defaulted to a
trial by judge.185 Clark was explicit in noting that under a jurywaiver default regime, judges were more likely to sit without juries
since inertia leads to waiver and not to jury trial like under the old
system.186 And as a practitioner noted just four years after the
adoption of the federal default rule, “The most effective device yet
evolved for effectuating a more limited use of the jury and yet which
preserves the constitutional right is that of requiring a party to
180 Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 968 (1987).
181 See generally Michael E. Smith, Judge Charles E. Clark and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 85 YALE L.J. 914 (1976) (outlining Clark’s integral role).
182 CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 53 (1928).
183 Fleming James, Jr., Trial by Jury and the New Federal Rules of Procedure, 45 YALE L.J.
1022, 1025–26 (1936).
184 See FED. R. CIV. P. 38(d) (“A party waives a jury trial unless its demand is properly
served and filed.”).
185 See Deborah J. Matties, A Case for Judicial Self-Restraint in Interpreting Contractual
Jury Trial Waivers in Federal Court, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 431, 442 (1997) (reviewing the
history of the jury trial waiver).
186 See Charles E. Clark, The New Illinois Civil Practice Act, 1 U. CHI. L. REV. 209, 213
(1933) (“Moreover where a judge is sitting without a jury, as he does more and more when
dockets become crowded and jury waiver automatic . . . .”). Clark had studied this and, in
other writings, compared empirical data on the number of jury trials in New York and
Connecticut, attributing Connecticut’s lower rate of jury trials to its automatic waiver rule.
See Charles E. Clark, Fact Research in Law Administrations, 2 CONN. B.J. 211, 226–27 (1928)
(noting that “[t]he small number of jury trials and the large number of jury-waived cases is
remarkable” when comparing a state like New York to one like Connecticut that implements
a jury-waiver rule).
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make a timely demand or be deemed to have waived his rights.”187
Automatic waiver allowed the drafters to limit jury trials under the
guise of litigant preferences.
Beyond introducing inertia against lay participation, the drafters
also limited jury trials by rendering them, essentially, unnecessary
through the adoption of procedures previously employed in juryless
courts of equity—namely, liberal discovery.188 Whereas at common
law trial was the premier opportunity for the competing sides to
share evidence, pretrial discovery practices required by the Federal
Rules allowed each side to assess the strength of their case in
advance.189 Under the new discovery rules, litigants could therefore
more accurately gauge the value of the case and, as they deemed
desirable, enter settlement agreements.190 The expected and
realized result is that most cases settle.191 As United States
Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch pithily acknowledged: “Not
long ago, we used to have trials without discovery. Now we have
discovery without trials.”192
The Federal Rules also led to fewer trials by permitting liberal
joinder of parties and claims.193 To make sense of these more
complicated proceedings, judges took on a more managerial role.194
Harry W. Henry, Jr., The Proposed Code of Civil Procedure for Missouri—Parties and
Pleadings, 7 MO. L. REV. 1, 6 (1942).
188 See Alan K. Goldstein, A Short History of Discovery, 10 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 257, 266
(1981) (discussing rule reforms intended to “facilitate wider availability of discovery”).
189 See Charles W. Sorenson, Jr., Disclosure Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)—
“Much Ado About Nothing?,” 46 HASTINGS L.J. 679, 690–91 (1995) (describing how the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure caused a shift from “a system in which lawyers were . . .
largely unrestrained in their efforts to prevail through surprise at trial” as most evidence was
presented for the first time at time to a system of “economy, efficiency, and justice” where
“discovery was intended to narrow issues that remained in dispute, equalize knowledge
among the parties about the evidence, [and] eliminate trickery or surprise at trial”).
190 See id. at 719 (“[D]isclosure [as encouraged by the Rules] would accelerate disposition
(including settlement) of cases by getting facts out early and facilitate planning when
discovery is necessary by focusing the courts and parties on areas where factual gaps exist.”).
191 Even though many think settlement is a welcome outcome, it is not an unalloyed good.
For a discussion of that problem, see generally Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases
Settle”: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339 (1994).
192 Tony Mauro, In Speech Notes, Neil Gorsuch Painted a Dark Picture of Litigation, NAT’L
L.J. (Mar. 14, 2017), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202781242573/.
193 See FED. R. CIV. P. 18–20 (outlining the rules for joinder of parties and claims).
194 See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 443 (1982) (“[T]he
structure of the Federal Rules, with provisions permitting liberal joinder of parties and
issues, encourages the problems that in turn invite management.”).
187
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In the 1960s, to facilitate case management, the judiciary
abandoned master calendars and adopted an individual assignment
system such that a single judge handled a case from filing to
finish.195 At the same time, courts issued a handbook instructing
judges to adopt a process of extensive pretrial conferencing, which
was designed to help judges address discovery disputes and to
identify and refine the issues in dispute.196 And by 1983, the Rules
listed “facilitating settlement” as a core objective of pretrial
conferencing.197 Trials were no longer the process of resolving
disputes, but rather the result of a breakdown in the settlement
process.
Legislation and further rule changes exacerbated these trends in
subsequent decades. Enacted in 1996, the Civil Justice Reform Act
required all federal district courts to implement “expense and delay
reduction plan[s]” to “facilitate deliberate adjudication of civil cases
on the merits, monitor discovery, improve litigation management,
and ensure just, speedy, and inexpensive resolutions of civil
disputes.”198 It promoted case management principles, guidelines,
and techniques for courts to adopt, and created a race among judges
to dispose of cases as quickly as possible.199 Anything that shortcircuited trial became preferable. Moreover, the 2015 changes to
Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regarding discovery
emphasized the need for discovery to be reasonable and
proportionate.200 These changes were designed, as the Advisory

See id. at 377–78 (discussing the effects of the individual assignment system).
See Handbook of Recommended Procedures for the Trial of Protracted Cases, 25 F.R.D.
351, 355 (1960) (setting forth judges’ pretrial investigative duties).
197 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(5) (“In any action, the court may order the attorneys and any
unrepresented parties to appear for one or more pretrial conferences for such purposes as . .
. facilitating settlement.”).
198 28 U.S.C. § 471.
199 See generally JAMES S. KAKALIK, TERENCE DUNWORTH, LAURAL A. HILL, DANIEL F.
MCCARRREY, MARIAN OSHIRO, NICHOLAS M. PACE & MARY E. VAIANA, THE INST. FOR CIV.
JUST., AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM
ACT (1996) (analyzing the widespread effects of the Civil Justice Reform Act).
200 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) (“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged
matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the
case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in
controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the
importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the
proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.”).
195
196
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Committee Notes to the new rule explain, to place even greater
emphasis on taking a managerial approach to judging.201
Other explanations for the decline of civil trials focus on more
recent interpretations of the Federal Rules, particularly on those
Rules governing dispositive motions. The Supreme Court’s 1986
trilogy of cases concerning Rule 56 summary judgment, for instance,
empowered judges to dismiss cases in which they concluded that no
genuine dispute of material fact existed so as to necessitate a
trial.202 The result is that a once rarely used procedure—indeed,
once earnestly referred to by a leading scholar as a “toothless
tiger”203—has had a major impact on the disposition of federal cases.
Approximately nineteen percent of federal cases are now resolved
by summary judgment.204 That figure is higher in certain types of
cases; for instance, a 2006 study found that courts granted in whole
or in part eighty percent of defendants’ summary judgment motions
in employment discrimination cases.205
Roughly twenty years after the Supreme Court judiciallytransformed the summary judgment standard, the Court took a
similar approach with respect to Rule 12(b)(6)’s motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim. In dual cases, the Court reformed the
traditional standard—one that for most of the twentieth century
required a plaintiff to provide only “a short and plain statement of

201 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee notes to 2015 amendment (noting, inter alia,
that “[t]he parties and the court have a collective responsibility to consider the proportionality
of all discovery and consider it in resolving discovery disputes”).
202 See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 598–99 (1986)
(finding no genuine dispute of material fact because the factual context rendered the claims
of the plaintiffs implausible); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986) (“[A]
court ruling on a motion for summary judgment must be guided by the . . . clear and
convincing evidentiary standard in determining whether a genuine issue of actual malice
exists.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986)
(“Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut,
but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed ‘to secure
the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.’” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1)).
203 Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1056 (2003).
204 Joe S. Cecil, Rebecca N. Eyre, Dean Miletich & David Rindskopf, A Quarter-Century of
Summary Judgment Practice in Six Federal District Courts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 861,
861 (2007).
205 Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed Pleading Standard for
Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1011, 1033.
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the claim” showing that the pleader is entitled to relief206—to the
far more restrictive requirement that plaintiffs plead “enough facts
to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence
of [the claim].”207 The Court tasked trial judges with drawing upon
their “judicial experience and common sense” in making that
determination.208 While judges still must accept all well-pleaded
allegations as true and credit all logical inferences, they may reject
conclusory allegations.209 Of course, what is conclusory is often in
the eye of the beholder. Judges thus now have license to decide for
themselves if a plaintiff’s claims are sufficiently plausible to allow
for further proceedings.210
Another explanation for the decline in trials emphasizes the rise
of mandatory arbitration. Although the 1925 precursor to what
would come to be the Federal Arbitration Act anticipated only
agreements between sophisticated actors—such as distant
merchants who were increasingly reliant on the nation’s railroad
networks and desired enforceable private dispute resolution
agreements211—by the second half of the century, the Supreme
Court had dramatically expanded its application to nearly all
agreements.212 Chasing what they hoped to be favorable treatment,
powerful economic actors began including binding arbitration
206 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); see Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (reinforcing a literal
interpretation of Rule 8(a)(2) as “not requir[ing] a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon
which he bases his claim” and that “to the contrary, all the Rules require is ‘a short and plain
statement of the claim’ that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is
and the grounds upon which it rests”); Lucas F. Tesoriero, Pre-Twombly Precedent: Have
Leatherman and Swierkiewicz Earned Retirement Too?, 65 DUKE L.J. 1521, 1527 (2016) (“For
nearly fifty years after Conley, notice pleading was the dominant standard employed by lower
courts when assessing a complaint’s sufficiency.”).
207 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).
208 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
209 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561.
210 Some authors have noted how similar the standard for motion to dismiss and summary
judgment have become under the Court’s Iqbal-Twombly standard. See, e.g., Suja A. Thomas,
The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15, 18–38 (2010) (making this comparison and asserting that the
“Iqbal/Twombly standard is unconstitutional”).
211 See Sam Cleveland, Note, A Blueprint for States to Solve the Mandatory Arbitration
Problem While Avoiding FAA Preemption, 104 MINN. L. REV. 2515, 2520–21 (2020)
(explaining how the major supporters of the Federal Arbitration Act in the early 1920s were
business groups and commercial organizations and that “[m]uch of the [Act]’s legislative
history shows that Congress only contemplated arbitration between businesses”).
212 See infra notes 214–216.
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clauses in a wide variety of employment and consumer contracts.213
Much of the case law, especially at the federal level, has developed
such that these agreements between actors of disparate
sophistication are enforceable even against typical contract
defenses such as fraud,214 illegality,215 and unconscionability.216 So
widespread has this system of jury-less private adjudication grown
that some have called it the “new litigation.”217
Finally, observers point to tort reform efforts to explain the
decline in jury trials in state courts.218 Specifically, the use of
damage caps—both for economic and noneconomic damages219—has
had a deleterious effect on the rate of public adjudication. Funded

213 See David Horton, Arbitration About Arbitration, 70 STAN. L. REV. 363, 366–68 (2018)
(discussing the effect of widespread arbitration clauses in employment and consumer
contracts).
214 See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403–04 (1967) (holding
that under the Federal Arbitration Act a court may only consider a claim of “fraud in the
inducement of the arbitration clause itself” and not “fraud in the inducement of the contract
generally”).
215 See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 449 (2006) (“[A] challenge
to the validity of the contract as a whole, and not specifically to the arbitration clause, must
go to the arbitrator.”).
216 See Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 531 U.S. 63, 71 (2010) (“[T]he basis of [the]
challenge [must] be directed specifically to the agreement to arbitrate before the [C]ourt will
intervene.”).
217 Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation,” 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 8.
218 See generally Ronen Avraham, Database of State Tort Law Reforms (7.1) (U. Tex. L., L.
&
Econ.
Rsch.
Paper
No.
e555,
2021),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=902711 (collecting and sorting the many
tort reform measures from around the country); see also Joanne Doroshow, Tort Reform:
Blocking the Courthouse Door and Denying Access to Justice, in 2 COLLECTED ESSAYS ON
EXPANDING ACCESS TO JUSTICE 57 (2016) (arguing that tort reforms have limited access to
justice and reduced jury trials).
219 The distinction between economic and noneconomic damages is often overstated in the
policy and popular discourse. Both forms of damages aim to compensate the victims of private
harm by making them whole, rather than to punish tortfeasors for their wrongdoing.
Economic damages compensate a victim for more easily calculable losses, such as medical
bills, lost income, or property loss. Noneconomic damages compensate a victim for harms that
are not readily translated into monetary terms, such as disfigurement or loss of reproductive
capacity. For a fuller discussion, see generally Kritzer et al., supra note 140. Still, the
“calculation of lost wages and future medical care can be hotly contested trial issues.”
Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical Malpractice Damages Caps, 80
N.Y.U. L. REV. 391, 439 (2005). As a result, assessing economic damages may oftentimes be
just as challenging as determining noneconomic damages.
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largely by pro-business interest groups,220 these tort reform efforts
set a maximum value for certain types of injury claims within
causes of action for medical malpractice, products liability, and
premises liability.221 These reforms not only arbitrarily supplant the
jury as fact-finder of the value of a given dispute, but they also limit
litigant’s and their attorney’s incentive to bring such claims because
the costs of litigating certain cases are prohibitive when compared
to the chance of receiving artificially limited compensation well
below what a judge or jury would find appropriate.222 As such, these
caps simultaneously decrease the number of trials and render jury
service less democratically meaningful. Where artificial damage
caps are in place, they also destroy the transparency of the jury trial

220 The insurance industry in particular lobbies vigorously for damage caps or immunity
based on false claims of increased claiming, rising jury verdicts, and skyrocketing tort system
costs in general, when their proposed solutions have no impact on the problems they identify.
See Geoff Boehm, Debunking Medical Malpractice Myths: Unraveling the False Premises
Behind “Tort Reform,” 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L., & ETHICS 357, 363 (2005) (“The insurance
industry, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and corporate front groups such as the American
Tort Reform Association have spent many tens of millions of dollars in pursuit of immunity
or limitations on liability from wrongdoing.” (footnote omitted)). In striking down Florida’s
noneconomic damage caps, the state supreme court observed that, while doctors received no
relief from high medical-malpractice insurance premiums, the purported purpose of the cap,
insurance companies enjoyed “an increase in their net income of more than 4300 percent.”
Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894, 914 (Fla. 2014). The caps, then, serve as
little more than increased profitability when insurance companies’ investments slide
downward. See Robert B. McKay, Rethinking the Tort Liability System: A Report from the
ABA Action Commission, 32 VILL. L. REV. 1219, 1219–21 (1987) (discussing how the insurance
industry faired from the 1960s through the 1980s).
221 See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-3-11 (2022) (limiting damages in medical malpractice
actions); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2946a (products liability actions); TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 75.004 (West 2021) (certain premises liability suits).
222 See Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Damage Caps and Access to Justice: Lessons
from Texas, 96 OR. L. REV. 635, 660–71 (2018) (“Ultimately, damage caps will not allow for
adequate compensation—enough to compensate the client, cover the lawyer’s costs, perhaps
a referral fee, and the lawyer’s fee.”); see also Mohammad Rahmati, David A. Hyman, Bernard
Black & Charles Silver, Insurance Crisis or Liability Crisis? Medical Malpractice Claiming
in Illinois, 1980–2010, 13 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 183, 202 (2016) (examining Illinois data
and concluding that, with caps, smaller damage cases “all but disappeared” and led to an
“increase in mean and median payouts [that] led many to conclude that the med mal system
has become more generous to plaintiffs [when] [t]he opposite [was] closer to reality”).
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because jurors are not informed that their verdicts will be
subsequently reduced.223
The impact of these explanations on the jury’s decline is difficult
to measure, both due to their overlapping nature but also due to the
lack of data. A 2020 study conducted by Professors Shari Seidman
Diamond and Jessica Salerno, and sponsored by the American Bar
Association, sought to make sense of these explanations by
conducting a national survey of legal professionals on their
understanding of why cases no longer proceed to jury trial.224 They
solicited participation from legal professionals across the country by
inviting them to complete the online survey anonymously.225 In
total, the study involved 1,460 respondents: “173 judges, 70% state
and 30% federal, and 1,282 attorneys, 63% who handle primarily
civil cases, 33% who handle primarily criminal cases, and 4% who
did not indicate whether they primarily handle civil or criminal
cases.”226
The results of the study are illuminating. They show that among
the most commonly accepted reasons among legal professionals for
the decline in trials was that “litigants would rather settle than go
to trial.”227 Judges particularly felt this way, with 89% of them
agreeing or strongly agreeing with that statement; attorneys
indicated their agreement, with 63.6% of attorneys agreeing or
strongly agreeing that preference for settlement resulted in fewer
trials.228 As Professors Diamond and Salerno note, “[W]hether or not
the perception is accurate in describing what most litigants want, it

223 See Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 355 (1998) (rejecting an
argument that the jury’s job was completed once it assessed damages, so that the law could
then be applied as failing “to preserve ‘the substance of the common-law right of trial by jury,’”
as required by the Seventh Amendment); Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt,
691 S.E.2d 218, 223 (Ga. 2010) (holding that a cap that applies once damages are assessed
“clearly nullifies the jury’s findings of fact regarding damages and thereby undermines the
jury’s basic function”).
224 See Diamond & Salerno, supra note 155, at 120–21 (“The survey was designed to
investigate how legal professionals who have firsthand experience with the decisions that
lead to or away from jury trials explain the reduction in jury trials in recent years. This Article
describes the results from this national survey of 1,460 legal professionals, both attorneys
and judges.”).
225 Id. at 120–21.
226 Id. at 127.
227 Id. at 128.
228 Id. at 128, 131.
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may explain why judges and attorneys encourage—or pressure—
litigants to waive trial and accept a settlement . . . .”229
The study also measured systemic effects as sources of the
reduction in civil jury trials. Respondents were asked to evaluate
the effects of five systemic changes: damage caps, mandatory
binding arbitration, increases in successful summary judgment
motions, increases in successful Daubert motions, and increases in
successful motions to dismiss.230 Damage caps and mandatory
binding arbitration were identified by respondents as having the
greatest influence on reducing trial rates.231 More than half of all
respondents perceived these two features as causing medium or
large reductions in the rate of jury trials—61.6% for damage caps
and 52.1% for mandatory binding arbitration.232 A significant
proportion of respondents (39.9%) perceived the increased use of
successful summary judgment motions as causing a moderate or
large reduction in jury trials.233 In contrast, most respondents saw
increases in successful Daubert motions and motions to dismiss as
having little to no effect in reducing jury trials.234
Also of interest, the study assessed how respondents compared
jury trials to other modes of dispute resolution, such as bench trials,
mediation, and binding arbitration.235 Respondents viewed jury
trials as among the fairest procedures (second only to nonbinding
mediation), and the procedure they preferred most.236 Attorneys
who regularly represented either plaintiffs or defendants saw jury
trials as fairer overall than bench trials; whereas, perhaps
understandably, civil judges saw themselves as fairer than juries.237
With that said, respondents also acknowledged that jury trials
had certain notable detriments, including that they were perceived
as “less predictable, slower, and less cost-effective than alternative
Id. at 131.
Id. at 143.
231 Id. at 121.
232 Id. at 144.
233 Id. at 144–45
234 Id. at 145.
235 See id. at 131–39 (“The survey asked civil attorneys and judges to rank four procedures
used to resolve civil cases—arbitration, mediation, jury trials, and bench trials—based on
their predictability, speed, cost effectiveness, fairness, and the respondent’s overall
preference for the procedure.”).
236 Id. at 121.
237 Id. at 137 fig. 5.
229
230
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procedures.”238 The authors note that “[t]his pattern suggests that
perceived risk, costs, and delay deter the use of jury trials despite
their attractiveness on other important dimensions.”239 These
perceived detriments are not new and have been seized on to justify
critiques and attacks on the institution by powerful economic and
political actors with dramatic effectiveness.
B. LEGAL CRITIQUES AND ATTACKS ON THE CIVIL JURY

Judicial and economic elites have hurried the decline of the civil
jury brought on by the practices just discussed by sustaining
critiques and attacks on the institution. Although civil juries were
celebrated in colonial America as well as during the nation’s first
century as a check on the exercise of arbitrary authority,240 it
inevitably followed that those with influence and clout resented the
loss of their natural institutional advantages when decision-making
is placed in the hands of more common folk. In fact, “[e]ver since
there have been juries or jurylike tribunals . . . there have been
attacks on their competence and even calls for their abolition.”241
The critiques have hardly varied over time. At a time when the
public clamor for civil jury trials in the Constitution should not yet
have faded, Georgia Chief Justice Joseph Lumpkin observed that,
while in “criminal proceedings, trial by jury cannot be too highly
appreciated or guarded with too much vigilance,” “[w]e may,
however, after all, doubt the essentiality of trial by jury in civil
cases.”242 Among the problems that existed when civil juries were de
rigueur, Lumpkin said, was the “time, trouble, and expense”
involved.243 Nearly a century later, particularly around the 1930s, a
number of judges, academics, and bar associations soured on civil
juries, questioning both their expense and their competence.244 For
Id. at 121.
Id.
240 See supra Section II.A.
241 Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Alan Reifman, Juror Comprehension and Public Policy:
Perceived Problems and Proposed Solutions, 6 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 788, 789 (2000).
242 Flint River Steamboat Co. v. Foster, 5 Ga. 194, 206 (1848).
243 Id. at 207.
244 See Stanley E. Sacks, Preservation of the Civil Jury System, 22 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 76,
79 (1965) (outlining the history of jury treatment at that time and how authors of “anti-jury
ferment” concluded that the “jury system deserved condemnation” due to delay and
“incompetence to perform the function assigned to it”).
238
239
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instance, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes in 1928 did not mince
words in a speech to the Federal Bar Association in New York: “Get
rid of jury trials as much as possible. . . . The ideal of justice is
incarnated in the judge.”245 Three decades later, many critics
continued to express that view, as Harvard Law School Dean Erwin
Griswold asked in 1962, “Why should anyone think that twelve
persons brought in from the street, selected in various ways, for
their lack of general ability, have any special capacity for deciding
controversies between persons?”246
These various critiques gained a modern-day foothold when the
Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether the Seventh
Amendment mandated trial by jury in stockholder derivative
actions. In Ross v. Bernhard, the Court held that the “right to jury
trial attaches to those issues in derivative actions as to which the
corporation, if it had been suing in its own right, would have been
entitled to a jury.”247 The decision relied on the traditional dividing
line of which aspects of a case sounded in equity as opposed to those
sounding in law.248 The Court’s opinion divided the claims within
the lawsuit to reach its conclusion and stated that the answer to the
question of when a jury is required “depends on the nature of the
issue to be tried rather than the character of the overall action.”249
A footnote attached to that statement explained that one of the
three factors that must be taken into consideration to determine the
applicability of the jury-trial right was “the practical abilities and
limitations of juries.”250
That phrase has only appeared in one other Supreme Court
opinion, also in a footnote, where the Court limited its meaning and
application to instances where “Congress has permissibly entrusted
the resolution of certain disputes to an administrative agency or
245 Renée Lettow Lerner, The Failure of Originalism in Preserving Constitutional Rights to
Civil Jury Trial, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 811, 873–74 (2014) (quoting Fewer Jury Trials
Urged by Hughes: More Power for the Federal Judges Would Improve System, He Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 7, 1928, at 3).
246 Hans Zeisel, The Debate over the Civil Jury in Historical Perspective, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 25, 26 (quoting 1962–63 HARVARD LAW SCHOOL DEAN’S REP. 5–6).
247 396 U.S. 531, 532–33 (1970).
248 See id. at 533 (discussing case law defining “the line between actions at law with legal
rights and suits in equity dealing with equitable matters” (first citing Parsons v. Bedford, 3
Pet. 433, 447 (1830); then citing Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U.S. 146, 151 (1891))).
249 Id. at 538.
250 Id. at 538 n.10 (emphasis added).
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specialized court of equity, and . . . jury trials would impair the
functioning of the legislative scheme.”251 Still, the Court’s earlier
acknowledgement that a practical assessment of a generic jury’s
capabilities is relevant to determining if the jury right applies to
particular issues became a talisman for those who continued to
advance the criticism that lay jurors were ill-equipped to make
factual findings when the issues were outside the average person’s
experience.
Even though the Supreme Court itself ascribed little meaning to
the footnote’s suggestion that the Seventh Amendment was cabined
by jurors’ presumptively limited abilities, the phrase “practical
abilities and limitations of juries” gained wider purchase among
other federal courts, appearing in thirty-four federal appellate
decisions and 114 district court opinions (yet only a mere fifteen
state court opinions).252 The phrase signaled to those who were
dissatisfied with jury verdicts that critiques of civil juries might
obtain traction with the courts sufficient to avoid jury trials.
Perhaps it is only coincidence, then, that shortly thereafter a
corporate public relations campaign took off, telling the public that
jurors were unqualified to decide complex and sophisticated issues
and tended to let sympathies override reason to reach supposedly
unfathomably high verdicts.253
As discussed in the previous section, the jury in actuality tends
to perform its fact-finding role fairly and admirably.254 High damage
awards in civil jury trials make the news because of their unusual
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 n.4 (1989).
See Westlaw, https://www.westlaw.com (last visited Sept. 15, 2022) (search “492 U.S.
33”; then navigate to the menu titled “Citing References” and select “Cases”); see also Arthur
R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush To Judgment: Are The “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,”
and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day In Court And Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 982, 1104–09 (1997) (discussing the impact of “the Supreme Court’s footnote in Ross
v. Bernhard announcing a three-prong jury-triability test” and providing examples of courts’
applications and interpretations of this test).
253 See Stephen Daniels, The Question of Jury Competence and the Politics of Civil Justice
Reform: Symbols, Rhetoric, and Agenda-Building, 52 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 269, 292 (1989)
(outlining how the insurance industry led an effort in the mid-1970s “through advocacy
advertising to influence and shape public opinion in cause of civil justice reform” to prevent
what it characterized as “ridiculously high jury awards”).
254 See supra notes 134–141 and accompanying text (providing evidence that juries and
judges tend to award damages at similar amounts and that punitive damages are generally
proportional to compensatory damages among other findings which indicate that juries tend
to perform their role in regards to damages appropriately).
251
252
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man-bites-dog quality, but their appearance may lead audience
members to overestimate their frequency and in turn causes risk
managers to overestimate liability exposure.255 Looking to tamp
down verdicts against their sponsors, corporate groups seized upon
these news reports and circulated skewed and fictionalized stories
about runaway juries giving large verdicts to undeserving
plaintiffs.256 This skewed rendition of what juries did helped to
create a political environment primed for jury-restrictive legislation
while blaming plaintiffs’ lawyers and juries for a broken civil justice
system.257
Attacks on civil juries not only encouraged legislation designed
to take constitutionally secured prerogatives away from the jury,
such as through damage-cap laws, but also influenced judicial
thinking and legal doctrine.258 It caused judges even in some
jurisdictions thought to be “plaintiff-friendly” to opine about the
problems with juries. For example, the Alabama Supreme Court has
noted three frequent criticisms of jurors: “the helplessness and lack
of sophistication of jurors obligated to resolve issues in complex
255 See Daniel S. Bailis & Robert J. MacCoun, Estimating Liability Risks with the Media as
Your Guide: A Content Analysis of Media Coverage of Tort Litigation, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
419, 426, 427 (1996) (presenting findings that media portrayals of damages depict higher
awards of damages than actually occur in most cases and indicating that such portrayals
“provide[] a dubious basis for sound decision making”); Steven Garber, Product Liability,
Punitive Damages, Business Decisions and Economic Outcomes, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 237, 250
(“The availability heuristic also suggests that when decisionmakers consider liability risk
they often substantially overestimate it. Contributing to this are high-visibility liability
episodes such as unusually large awards, punitive damages, and liability when injury
causation is disputed by respected authorities.”).
256 For a comprehensive debunking of the tall tales that were circulated, see generally Marc
Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the Civil Justice System, 40
ARIZ. L. REV. 717 (1998) (providing empirical data and detailing the facts of lawsuits in which
large damages were awarded and those same facts as portrayed by corporate groups).
257 See, e.g., THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS: THE BATTLE OVER
LITIGATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 26 (2002) (“The notoriety of tort litigation, combined with
the powers of persuasion of corporate and professional interests, has put personal injury
lawsuit reform at the top of the antilitigation agenda.”); STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE
MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF REFORM 20–21 (1995) (describing the political
clout, resources, and propaganda utilized to sell the ideas of runaway juries and a system out
of whack).
258 See Shaakirrah R. Sanders, Deconstructing Juryless Fact-Finding in Civil Cases, 25
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 235, 257 n.160 (2016) (explaining how a “core dispute among states
is the scope of state legislative power to alter or replace the jury’s determination of the value
of an injury” using damage-cap laws and citing several state court decisions evaluating such
laws).
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litigation;” jurors’ overcompensation of “injured tort victims for
noneconomic damages;” and the “‘unbridled’ discretion jurors enjoy
in imposing massive punitive damage awards.”259 The West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals expressed a similar sentiment when it
asserted that “[c]ourts understand that juries operate on largely
emotive principles and that jury awards can be substantially in
excess of what judges, educated in law as a science, would award in
similar circumstances.”260 Yet empirical research establishes that
judges and jurors tend to reach similar conclusions about liability,261
compensatory damages,262 and punitive damages.263
Perhaps there is no better example of how this campaign
influenced judicial doctrine than in the area of punitive damages.
To understand, it is important to stress that the Seventh
Amendment both preserves civil trial by jury as it was practiced
under the English common law at the time when the Bill of Rights
was added to the Constitution and also prohibits reexamination of
facts determined by a jury.264 The English common law recognized
that “the jury are judges of the damages.”265 Thus, if damage
assessment was committed to the jury’s determination, judges have
no authority to substitute their own numbers for the jury’s.266 Nor
do legislatures in common-law causes of action.267 Since at least
Cent. Ala. Elec. Coop. v. Tapley, 546 So. 2d 371, 376 (Ala. 1989).
Roberts v. Stevens Clinic Hosp., Inc., 345 S.E.2d 791, 803 (W. Va. 1986).
261 See VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 127, at 148–52 (2007) (presenting research findings
that judges and juries agreed on liability “in about four out of five cases”).
262 See id. at 299–302 (presenting findings that jurors and judges “thought about the
relative severity of the injuries in remarkably similar ways” and generally awarded
approximately the same amount of compensatory damages).
263 See Theodore Eisenberg, Neil LaFountain, Brian Ostrom, David Rottman & Martin T.
Wells, Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 743,
779 (2002) (“Juries and judges award punitive damages at about the same rate, and their
punitive awards bear about the same relation to their compensatory awards.”).
264 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
265 Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 353 (1998) (quoting Lord
Townsend v. Hughes (1677) 86 Eng. Rep. 994, 994–95 (C.P.)).
266 See Hetzel v. Prince William Cnty., 523 U.S. 208, 211 (1998) (per curiam) (stating that
the Seventh Amendment’s “prohibition on the reexamination of facts determined by a jury”
bars a court from substituting its own “estimate of the amount of damages” for the damages
as determined by the jury).
267 See, e.g., Hilburn v. Enerpipe Ltd., 442 P.3d 509, 524 (Kan. 2019) (holding that the
Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights disallows statutory noneconomic damage caps); Watts v.
Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633, 636 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) (deciding that statutory
259
260
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1851, the Supreme Court has recognized that the jury’s preeminent
role in assessing punitive damages was so well established that “the
question will not admit of argument.”268
Despite this constitutional history, and the infrequency with
which punitive damages were awarded,269 a campaign developed in
the 1980s that caught the Supreme Court justices’ eyes.270
Businesses used a comprehensive array of press releases to
highlight outlier punitive damage verdicts, portraying them as
typical.271 These tall tales, such as the highly publicized McDonald’s
“hot coffee” case, were further circulated by politicians hoping to
score points with a well-heeled constituency.272 Insurers and
business groups bemoaned the bet-the-company consequences of an
noneconomic damage caps infringes on the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Missouri
Constitution); Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d 218, 220 (Ga.
2010) (finding that noneconomic damage caps violate the Georgia Constitution); Moore v.
Mobile Infirmary Ass’n., 592 So. 2d 156, 164 (Ala. 1991) (holding that statutorily limiting
noneconomic damages violates the Alabama Constitution); Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 771
P.2d 711, 712 (Wash. 1989) (en banc) (deciding that noneconomic damage caps violate the
Washington Constitution). Oddly, while not overruling Watts, the Missouri Supreme Court
subsequently held that when the legislature codifies the common law and adds a damage cap,
it removes the issue from the purview of the state constitution’s “inviolate” right to trial by
jury. Ordinola v. Univ. Physician Assocs., 625 S.W.3d 445, 449–51 (Mo. 2021) (en banc). The
decision, thus, permits the legislature to restrict the authority of a civil jury even if such a
ploy would not be valid under the Seventh Amendment. See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg,
492 U.S. 33, 42 (1989) (relying on the legal-equity dichotomy to determine if the issue was
committed to a jury’s determination).
268 Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363, 371 (1851).
269 See THOMAS H. COHEN & KYLE HARBACEK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFF. OF JUST.
PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARDS IN STATE COURTS, 2005, at
1 (2011), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pdasc05.pdf (reporting that “[p]unitive
damages were awarded in 700 (5%) of the 14,359 trials where the plaintiff prevailed” and that
the “median punitive damage award for the 700 trials with punitive damages was $64,000 in
2005”).
270 See PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 3–10
(1988) (describing a supposedly rampant increase in tort suits and damage awards). But see
Mark M. Hager, Civil Compensation and Its Discontents: A Response to Huber, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 539, 547, 579 (1990) (pointing out fallacies in figures used by Huber).
271 See Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Jury Verdicts and the Crisis in Civil Justice, 11
JUST. SYS. J. 321, 325 (1986) (describing the “horror story” public relations campaigns that
big businesses ran).
272 See Deborah Jones Merritt & Kathryn Ann Barry, Is the Tort System in Crisis? New
Empirical Evidence, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 315, 316 (1999) (“Politicians exchange tales of the
psychic who recovered a million dollars from her doctor, claiming that a CAT scan destroyed
her psychic powers, and stories of the woman who won several million dollars from
McDonald’s after spilling a cup of coffee on herself.”).
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adverse punitive damages verdict, paid for studies that often
utilized problematic methodologies to support the campaign’s
viewpoint,273 and cited these studies and unfiltered examples from
news reports in Supreme Court certiorari petitions and briefs274
with a plea that unrestricted punitive damages constituted a form
of excessive fines or violated due process.275
The Supreme Court initially resisted entreaties to apply a
constitutionally based limit on punitive damages.276 However, usual
swing-Justice Sandra Day O’Connor bemoaned “skyrocketing”
punitive damage awards and their supposed adverse effect on
product innovation,277 apparently accepting the false portrayal of
out-of-control juries. It was not long before a majority of the Court
shared Justice O’Connor’s sentiment; it held that due process placed
a constitutional limit on “grossly excessive” punitive damages,
relying on vague and subjective guideposts278 and whether the size
of the punitive damages “raise[s] a suspicious judicial eyebrow.”279
After subjecting punitive damage verdicts to a due-process
override, the natural next question was what to do when punitive
damages were unconstitutionally excessive. Should the question be
resubmitted to the jury, or should a judge choose the amount? The
answer depends on whether the Seventh Amendment applies. The
constitutional history was clear; juries are “judges of the
273 See Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75 MINN.
L. REV. 1, 14 (1990) (describing press kits and publicity tactics highlighting tales and
anecdotes about punitive-damage verdicts,); see also Michael L. Rustad, The Closing of
Punitive Damages’ Iron Cage, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1297, 1298 (2005) (“Much of what is
asserted about the nature of punitive damages is untrue, unknown, or stitched together from
questionable sources.”).
274 See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 501 n.17 (2008) (declining to rely
upon Exxon-funded studies that used “mock juries” to demonstrate the unpredictability of
punitive damage awards and describing the studies as part of “a body of literature running
parallel to anecdotal reports”).
275 See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 276–78 (1989)
(finding that the due-process argument was not preserved and rejecting the applicability of
the Excessive Fines Clause).
276 Id. at 280.
277 Id. at 282 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing HUBER, supra
note 270, at 152–71).
278 See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574–75 (1996) (holding that the degree
of reprehensibility, the disparity of harm and award, and sanctions in comparable cases are
the controlling factors).
279 Id. at 583 (quoting TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 481
(1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)).
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damages.”280 But the Supreme Court adopted a fiction to conclude
that judges could replace the jury’s determination with their own.
It declared that compensation was the type of fact reserved for a
jury’s determination and that, although punitive damages
previously served a compensatory purpose, they no longer did.281
Instead, the Court said that punitive damages were the jury’s
“expression of its moral condemnation” of egregious misconduct and
not a factual determination.282 By reclassifying the jury’s role with
respect to punitive damages, the Court opened the door to revision
of the verdict by both trial and appellate judges. Without any
change in constitutional language and disregarding the
longstanding regard of punitive damages as separate and above
compensation,283 the Court limited the jury’s role in determining
punitive damages and increased the role of judges.284
Years later, the Court considered newly collected data and
concluded that the empirical assumptions underlying this
jurisprudential change were not well grounded. As the Court
recognized, “[T]he most recent studies tend to undercut much of [the
criticism of punitive damages].”285 Moreover, research “reveals that
discretion to award punitive damages has not mass-produced
runaway awards.”286 Rather than the bill of goods they had been
sold, the Justices conceded that the data revealed “an overall
restraint” on the part of juries.287 The die, however, had been cast.

Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 353 (1998) (quoting Lord
Townshend v. Hughes (1677) 86 Eng. Rep. 994, 995 (C.P.)).
281 See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432, 437, 437–38
n.11 (2001) (“Until well into the 19th century, punitive damages frequently operated to
compensate for intangible injuries . . . .”).
282 Id. at 432.
283 See Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 107 (1893) (recognizing
that punitive damages are awarded “not by way of compensation to the sufferer, but by way
of punishment of the offender, and as a warning to others”); see also Anthony J. Sebok, What
Did Punitive Damages Do? Why Misunderstanding the History of Punitive Damages Matters
Today, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 163, 164 (2003) (“[I]t would be at best anachronistic (and at
worst misleading) to say that punitive damages served primarily a compensatory function in
the early years of American tort law . . . .”).
284 See Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 431 (holding that appellate courts must review the
constitutionality of punitive damages awards under a de novo standard, rather than the less
intensive “abuse of discretion” standard).
285 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 497 (2008).
286 Id.
287 Id. at 498–99.
280
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Judges would scrutinize and adjust punitive damage verdicts after
the fact, rendering the jury’s determination more advisory.
The transformation of the jury’s role with respect to punitive
damages followed a strategic blueprint that has successfully
transformed the law in other areas where juries have historically
played a constitutionally consecrated role as well. Step one is to
appeal to the idea that jurors lack the sophistication necessary to
assess complex information and give in too easily to emotion. Then,
having established a level of agreement with that proposition, step
two is to advocate for changes that limit the jury’s scope.
For instance, another area where this blueprint succeeded is the
increased authority of judges over expert evidence. First, the critics
argued that juries could not be expected to understand complex
scientific or other technical evidence from experts.288 Second, giving
examples of juries siding with seemingly incredulous expert
testimony that was purposely presented in a damning light as “junk
science,”289 a call was made to rethink the rules that would admit
such evidence.290 And, as with punitive damages, the Court
See, e.g., Daniels, supra note 253, at 280 (“[J]uries are not competent to decide issues in
complex, lengthy trials . . . [as] jury attention span decreases in long trials, especially
antitrust, products liability, or medical malpractice cases, which entail complicated evidence
. . . [and] [j]uries are likely to be misled, or confused in such cases by . . . technical evidence,
thereby eliminating any chance for a fair, rational decision. . . . Uninformed, gullible lay jurors
may accept expert testimony uncritically, ignore it, or just not understand it at all.”); Edward
J. Imwinkelried, Judge Versus Jury: Who Should Decide Questions of Preliminary Facts
Conditioning the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence?, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 577, 580 (1984)
(contending that jurors are “incompetent to evaluate scientific proof critically”); Martin H.
Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of Rational
Decision Making, 70 NW. U. L. REV. 486, 505 (1975) (questioning ability of jurors in complex
antitrust or shareholder suits).
289 PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO’S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 1–6 (1991).
The basis for the claim that junk science was overrunning the courts was authoritatively
refuted by other writers. See Kenneth J. Chesebro, Galileo’s Retort: Peter Huber’s Junk
Scholarship, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1637, 1642 (1993) (“Galileo’s Revenge and its author have
received heavy publicity and have been treated by lawyers as well as laypeople as if they were
part of legitimate scholarship on these issues . . . .”).
290 See, e.g., Peter Huber, Junk Science and the Jury, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 273, 278, 302
(1990) (calling for a change to “reduce the amount of science that juries must decide for
themselves” because of the continuing problems of “junk science” as “juries sometimes accept
factual claims that mainstream scientists categorically reject”). But see Robert Blomquist,
Science, Toxic Tort Law, and Expert Evidence: A Reaction to Peter Huber, 44 ARK. L. REV.
629, 652 (1991) (finding Huber’s arguments to limit scientific evidence admitted to juries
288
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succumbed to the criticism and created a gatekeeper role so that
judges would prevent juries from hearing certain expert testimony
previously deemed admissible.291 To accomplish that result, the
Court read the existing rule in a new way. The relevant rule on
expert evidence states that such testimony is admissible if its
probative value helps the jury understand a fact at issue,292 such as
whether exposure to a toxic chemical caused the plaintiff’s injury.
For years, under the previous standard, courts had admitted
expert testimony to help the jury connect the dots when the evidence
provided was “generally accepted” within the expert’s field.293
However, because of how quickly science advances, this generalacceptance standard was presented as failing to keep up with new
research.294 To address that concern, the Court reinterpreted the
expert evidence rule to permit the admission of novel scientific
evidence so long as it was based on scientifically acceptable
methodologies.295 On its face, the change appeared to liberalize the
admissibility of expert evidence. Yet, at the same time, in adopting
the new standard, the Court also enhanced the gatekeeper role that
judges play in deciding the expert-evidence admissibility question.

unpersuasive because his “vision expects too much of mainstream scientific testimony in an
area where too little expert consensus exists” and “expects too little of our common law
heritage” including judge and jury prerogatives in furthering equity and social justice).
291 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993) (“Faced with a
proffer of expert scientific testimony, then, the trial judge must determine at the outset,
pursuant to Rule 104(a), whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge
that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue.” (emphasis
added) (footnote omitted)).
292 See FED. R. EVID. 702(a) (“A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if . . . the
expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue . . . .”).
293 See Frye v. United States, 193 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (“[W]hile courts will go a
long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or
discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to
have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.”).
294 See Frederick B. Lacey, Scientific Evidence, 24 JURIMETRICS J. 254, 265 (1984) (“[T]he
Frye jurisdictions will always lag behind the advances of science while they wait for novel
scientific techniques to gain ‘general acceptance.’”).
295 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588 (discarding the traditional “general acceptance” test for
admissibility of expert opinion evidence).
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The corporate public-relations machine then again moved into
high gear, proclaiming a great victory against “junk science.”296
Conferences, articles, and continuing legal education programs
emphasized the judges’ gatekeeper role in keeping expert evidence
from coming before a jury, rather than the broader admissibility of
new or novel science.297 Judges’ understanding of the new precedent
aligned with that publicity.298 The result was a more restrictive
approach to expert evidence that ended up frequently constricting
juries in the discharge of their constitutionally assigned role as factfinders. As with punitive damages, the empirical evidence did not
catch up in time. Studies do not bear out the inaccurate caricature
of juries completely befuddled by scientific evidence.299
C. A CULTURE DISCOURAGING OF CIVIL JURY TRIALS

The artificial barriers constructed through legislation, rules, and
judicial doctrine have significantly diminished the uses and
prevalence of jury trials. Meanwhile, other developments, such as
budgetary crises, have compounded the problem and further
diminished juries.300 If not for a cultural predilection that believes
juries are not a core component of our democratic structure and
instead are luxuries that are expensive, antiquated, and
unnecessary, years-long postponements of civil jury trials would not
be seen as a solution to nearly every subsequent crisis faced by
society.

296 For a description of these efforts, see Allan Kanner & M. Ryan Casey, Daubert and the
Disappearing Jury Trial, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 281, 296–97 (2007).
297 See Robert S. Peck & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Right to Trial by Jury as A Fundamental
and Substantive Right and Other Civil-Trial Constitutional Protections, 96 OR. L. REV. 489,
508–09 (2018) (describing how the Daubert Test has increased pretrial attacks on experts).
298 See Kanner & Casey, supra note 296, at 283 (recognizing that, rather than liberalize
admission of scientific evidence, Daubert accomplished “the exact opposite”).
299 See, e.g., Richard Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Taking Stock After Twelve
Years, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 235 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993) (“[T]he
weight of the evidence indicates that juries can reach rationally defensible verdicts in
complex cases.”).
300 See RICHARD Y. SCHAUFFLER & MATTHEW KLEIMAN, THE BOOK OF THE STATES, STATE
COURTS AND THE BUDGET CRISIS: RETHINKING COURT SERVICES 2010, at 289 (“Like other
public institutions, courts in many states are thrust into crisis mode, and forced to respond
by creating immediate savings through reducing services, closing courthouses, [and]
suspending jury trials in civil cases.”).
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Examples abound. Tightened state budgets have resulted in
court systems deferring civil jury trials despite state constitutional
promises against “unnecessary delay” and an “inviolate” right to a
jury trial.301 For more than a decade, states have cut overall
budgets, resulting in reductions of money allocated to state courts
by as much as twenty percent.302 New Hampshire started this
money-crunching trend by suspending civil jury trials.303 In
California, where the courts have been hit hard by budget cuts, the
2021 budget contained an increase in court funding, but was
insufficiently large such that the legislature’s budgetary analysis
arm projected that they would still need to reduce expenditures by
a minimum of fifty million dollars in 2021–22.304 As an expensive
item for trial courts, civil jury trials may well be suspended—again.
Similarly, Florida faced an overall budget deficit of $5.4 billion in
2020, while its courts estimated that nearly one million more cases
would be added to trial courts’ dockets by mid-2021.305 All that is to
say, funding courts is a choice. And the policy of cutting budgets and
insufficiently funding courts is part of a broader, growing notion
that civil trials can be easily discarded if done in furtherance of
some vague notion of efficiency.306
The COVID-19 pandemic has further exposed this cultural
disposition to devalue the jury and exacerbated the effects. Health
concerns have required courts to adjust their approaches to
conducting jury trials to ensure public safety, but courts around the
country largely took the approach of simply refusing to hold civil
See, e.g., WASH. CONST. art. I, §§ 10, 21 (respectively).
See SCHAUFFLER & KLEIMAN, supra note 300, at 289 (“In the 2010 fiscal year, 40 state
court budgets were cut . . . . The cumulative cuts have reached as high as 20 percent of the
court budget . . . .”).
303 Id. at 290; see also Abby Goodnough, Jury Trials to Be Halted in One State Feeling
Pinch, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/09/us/09court.html (“The
Superior Court . . . in New Hampshire will take the unusual step of halting jury trials . . .
because of a widening state budget crisis.”).
304 See THE 2021–22 BUDGET: TRIAL COURT OPERATIONS PROPOSALS, CAL. LEGIS.
ANALYST’S OFF. (Feb. 11, 2021), https://lao.ca.gov/Publications/Report/4362 (“[T]he expiration
of $50 million in one-time funding provided in the current year means that trial courts could
need to reduce expenditures by at least a further $50 million in 2021–22.”).
305 Andrew Strickler, State Court Budget Forecast: Stormy, with Rising Case Backlogs,
LAW360 (Nov. 23, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1331216/state-court-budgetforecast-stormy-with-rising-backlogs.
306 See Peck & Chemerinsky, supra note 297, at 493 (recognizing that “[t]hese movements
away from jury trials [are] often in the name of efficiency”).
301
302
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jury trials rather than find ways to make it work.307 Like many
states, New Mexico instituted a suspension of jury trials in response
to surging COVID-19 cases at the end of 2020 and only began those
trials again on February 1, 2021.308 The federal court system acted
similarly, with the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts reporting in
November 2020 that “[a]bout two dozen U.S. district courts have
posted orders that suspend jury trials.”309 The result left hundreds
of thousands civil cases languishing in a standstill and has
discouraged litigants from bringing new cases, leading to a looming
backlog of cases some estimate to number in the millions.310
Though as of this writing, many state and federal courts have
reopened, the more than a year of courts treating civil jury trials as
expendable has had both short-term and long-term effects. Among
the federal appellate courts, only the Ninth Circuit held that the
suspension of jury trials for lack of funds violated the Seventh
Amendment’s guarantee.311 And the COVID-19 Omicron variant’s
emergence in the winter of 2021 again caused many courts to
shutter their doors to civil jury trials, demonstrating the
unpredictability of a pandemic.312
In the short term, the decision to forgo civil jury trials creates
significant backlogs, which further causes court systems to look for
ways to cut corners to reduce the number of cases requiring juries
because of the time and resources needed. The public loses its

See, e.g., Ed Spillane, The End of Jury Trials: Covid-19 and the Courts: The Implications
and Challenges of Holding Hearings Virtually and in Person During a Pandemic from a
Judge’s Perspective, 18 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 537, 538 (2021) (“[T]he ability to hold jury trials
has almost completely grounded to a halt since March 2020.”).
308 Order in the Matter of the Amendment of the New Mexico Judiciary Public Health
Emergency Protocols for the Safe and Effective Administration of the New Mexico Judiciary
During the COVID-19 Public Health Emergency, No. 20-8500-042, at 17 (N.M. Dec. 14, 2020).
309 Courts Suspending Jury Trials as COVID-19 Cases Surge, U.S. CTS. (Nov. 20, 2020),
https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2020/11/20/courts-suspending-jury-trials-covid-19-casessurge.
310 See ROBINSON & GIBSON, supra note 51 (“[O]ver a million cases that were not filed in
2020 could make their way into the courts . . . . [T]his speaks to the need to address growing
backlogs in civil courts . . . .”).
311 See Armster v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 792 F.2d 1423, 1430 (9th Cir.
1986) (“[W]e conclude that the Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury trial is violated when,
because of [budgetary] suspensions, an individual is not afforded, for any significant period
of time, a jury trial he would otherwise receive.”).
312 See supra note 47 and accompanying text (detailing the effect of the Omicron variant on
state and federal courtroom closures in California).
307
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opportunity to be involved in resolving disputes during a time when
it is perhaps most necessary that it be involved. And in the longterm, lay participation atrophy sets in, leading litigants and jurists
to believe that their business does not require the public’s
scrutiny.313 Even more people will be driven to private adjudication
services,314 further diminishing the number of jury trials. With jury
trials now a rarity, few new lawyers will learn the art of trying a
case before a jury, thereby creating a persistent cycle of lawyers
opting not to go the jury route because they lack the skillset and
familiarity needed for success before a panel.315
The cost to society if this culture and decline are not reversed will
be substantial. Recall an observation Alexis de Tocqueville made in
a preface to his book, Democracy in America:
If the lights that guide us ever go out, they will fade
little by little, as if of their own accord. Confining
ourselves to practice, we may lose sight of basic
principles, and when these have been entirely forgotten,
we may apply the methods derived from them badly; we
might be left without the capacity to invent new
methods and only able to make a clumsy and an
unintelligent use of wise procedures no longer
understood.316
It is critical that the benefits of the civil jury and jury service be
fully appreciated, and that we take appropriate action to revive it,
less the institution’s light be fully extinguished. American

313 See James M. Chadwick & Gary L. Bostwick, Images of Fair Use: A Fair Use of Jury
Trial, 24 COMMC’NS L. 11, 18 (2006) (explaining public scrutiny’s role in the court system).
314 See Smith & MacQueen, supra note 163, at 33 (noting that even prior to the pandemic
an increasing number of cases were being resolved through private adjudication).
315 Some judges have grown particularly concerned with this phenomenon and have
adopted “Junior Attorney Rules” encouraging litigants to give standup roles to attorneys with
less than five years’ experience. See, e.g., CHIP’S NEXT GEN COMM., JUDICIAL ORDERS
PROVIDING/ENCOURAGING
OPPORTUNITIES
FOR
JUNIOR
LAWYERS
(2016),
https://nextgenlawyers.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Judicial-Orders-re-Next-Gen-6-1316.pdf (noting that Judge Lucy Koh, Northern District of California, “strongly encourages
parties to permit less experienced lawyers to examine witnesses at trial and to have an
important role at trial”).
316 TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 22, at 464.
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democratic renewal might lie through restoring the promises of the
civil jury.

IV. RESTORING THE DEMOCRATIC PROMISE OF THE CIVIL JURY
Given the centrality of the civil jury in the United States’
constitutional structure,317 as well as the benefits the jury offers for
the administration of civil justice and society more broadly,318 the
severe decline and disuse of the institution should give us pause.
Exalting the role of judges in resolving disputes at the cost of
excluding people from meaningful civic participation has rippling
consequences. It disinvests the public in the success of the Republic,
suggesting to individuals that the state operates without them. As
Plato warned over a two millennia ago, “[I]n private suits, too, as
far as is possible, all should have a share; for he who has no share
in the administration of justice, is apt to imagine that he has no
share in the state at all.”319 America’s recent turn toward
abandoning its democratic principles might be course-corrected by
reinvesting the public in civil dispute resolution.
To do so, it is imperative that active measures be taken to revive
the institution to its once premier role. Critically, these strategies
should not be based on speculation or misrepresentation of the jury
or jurors, but instead on empirical support and research to ensure
that the benefits of lay judicial participation are more fully realized.
Drawing on such research, we offer here the following six
recommendations designed to (A) remove barriers to civil jury trials
to make them more likely to occur when parties so desire, and (B)
promote better civil jury fact-finding to ensure more accurate
dispute resolution. Strengthening the institution so as to encourage
inviting the public back into the courthouse can help loosen that
coddling mindset that a private dispute and its just resolution
belongs solely to the litigants.

See supra Section II.A.
See supra Section II.B.
319 Plato, Laws IV 768, in 2 THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 529 (B. Jowett trans., Random House
ed., 1937).
317
318
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A. REMOVING BARRIERS TO CIVIL JURY TRIALS

The first step for reviving the civil jury as an institution so that
it might again contribute to renewing America’s commitment to
democratic self-governance is ensuring that all litigants who desire
a jury trial are able to receive one. The sociopolitical benefits of jury
service can only result if trials actually occur and if jurors are called
upon to determine the outcome. The following three research-based
recommendations are designed to remove barriers to civil jury trials
and thereby lower costs associated with employing juries. These
include (1) returning to a civil jury-trial default rule; (2) repealing
statutory restrictions on jurors calculating damages; and (3)
experimenting with procedural arrangements to lower the costs to
litigants and society associated with employing civil juries.
1. Adopt a Jury-Trial Default Rule. One of the easiest ways to
restore the civil jury as a meaningful component of the judiciary is
for courts to readopt a jury-trial default rule. This means that
litigants would receive a civil jury trial unless they affirmatively
waived their right to one, as opposed to the current approach taken
in federal and most state jurisdictions in which litigants must
affirmatively demand a civil jury trial.320 As noted above, the
current waiver default was adopted purposefully by drafters
motivated by anti-jury animus in order to limit the number of jury
trials.321 Now-Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch and U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Judge Susan Graber have argued
in support of the proposal because reverting back to a jury-default
approach would accomplish three main goals: (1) “encourage jury
trials;” (2) increase “simplicity;” (3) result in “greater certainty,”
particularly for pro se litigants and in cases removed from state
courts; and (4) “honor[] the Seventh Amendment more fully.”322
The automatic waiver rule was adopted at the federal level in
1938 concomitantly with the merger of courts of law and equity, and
it has remained largely unchanged since then.323 But it is important
See supra notes 187–188.
See supra notes 180–187 and accompanying text.
322 HON. NEIL GORSUCH & HON. SUSAN GRABER, COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE,
MEMORANDUM:
16-CV-F
(June
13,
2016),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/16-cv-f-suggestion_gorsuch_0.pdf.
323 The only changes have concerned at what time the litigant need to make the demand.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 38 advisory committee notes (“The times set in the former rule at 10 days
have been revised to 14 days.”).
320
321

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2022

63

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 57, No. 1 [2022], Art. 3

142

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:79

to note that nothing about merged courts necessitates this approach
to the jury. A number of state judiciaries merged their courts in the
mid-nineteenth century without requiring litigants to affirmatively
demand a jury trial.324 But as the trend toward merged courts
spread in late nineteenth century, so too did broad antipathy toward
the jury.325 Following the Civil War, the jury-waiver rule grew as a
popular tool for limiting the frequency of jury trials while, at least
formally, securing the institution’s position within the new
courts.326 It was this trend that the drafters of the Federal Rules
latched onto as a mechanism to sideline the jury in 1938.327 So
common did this approach become over the twentieth century that
today only Georgia, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, and Oregon
broadly maintain jury-trial default rules in most of their civil
courts.328
324 New York, after merging their courts in 1846, was the first state by statute to allow
litigants to waive their right to a civil jury trial, but such waiver could only occur in three
ways: “(1) by failing to appear at the trial; (2) by written consent, in person or by attorney,
filed with the clerk; or (3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes.” Act of Apr.
12, 1848, ch. 379, § 221, 1848 N.Y. Laws 497, 538. It did not require an affirmative jury
demand. Id.
325 As Justice Lumpkin of the Supreme Court of Georgia noted in 1848: “[I]t is notorious,
that modern law reform, both in England, and in this country, seeks . . . to dispense, as much
as possible with juries. A jury is never to be invoked, unless specially demanded by one of the
parties.” Flint River Steamboat Co. v. Foster, 5 Ga. 194, 207 (1848). He added further that
this approach “is a vast saving of time, trouble, and expense, to suitors and the country,”
though recognized that there might be broader detriments. See id. (“Whether these
considerations should outweigh the advantages resulting from a personal participation, by
every citizen, in the practical administration of public justice, it does not become me to say.”).
326 For an excellent review of the migration of the Field Code across the country in the
nineteenth century, which served as a model for many states, see Kellen Funk & Lincoln A.
Mullen, The Spine of American Law: Digital Text Analysis and U.S. Legal Practice, 123 AM.
HIST. REV. 132, 132–33 (2018).
327 See supra notes 186–187 and accompanying text.
328 See O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-38 to -39 (2007) (“The right of trial by jury as declared by the
Constitution of the state or as given by a statute of the state shall be preserved to the parties
inviolate.”); MINN. R. CIV. P. 38.01 (“[T[he issues of fact shall be tried by a jury, unless a jury
trial is waived or a reference is ordered.”); MISS. R. CIV. P. 38(a) ) (“The right of trial by jury
as declared by the Constitution or any statute of the State of Mississippi shall be preserved
to the parties inviolate.”); MO. SUP. CT. R. 69.01 01 (“The right of trial by jury as declared by
the Constitution or as given by a statute shall be preserved to the parties inviolate.”); OR. R.
CIV. P. 51(c) (“The trial of all issues of fact shall be by jury unless . . . .”). Some states, such as
Nebraska, have different default rules for different types of courts. See, e.g., Jacobson v.
Shresta, 849 N.W.2d 515, 519 (Neb. 2014) (noting that the Nebraska constitution “provides
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Restoring the jury-trial default rule could have a number of
positive consequences for the jury and the administration of civil
justice. For one, it could increase the number of civil jury trials
conducted. As legal scholars James Pike and Henry Fisher
succinctly noted in 1940, “[Under the waiver rule] the formula has
been changed from inertia = jury trial, to inertia = no jury trial.”329
Flipping that equation back could have the opposite effect. There is
robust economic literature on the power of default rules to nudge
actors toward preferred outcomes while preserving their freedom to
choose alternative options.330 That is, the default rule would not
inhibit those litigants who wish to have a bench trial, but it would
instead impose a small cost (in the form of an affirmative action) for
them to do so.
Moreover, adopting the rule would prevent the inadvertent
waiver of a significant constitutional right. This is particularly true
for low-information litigants, who are most likely to be affected by
default rules.331 But it would also be implicated in cases removed to
federal court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 81(c)(3).332 That
rule and its dizzying exceptions have been criticized as “poorly
crafted” with “needless complexity,” and has been called a “trap for
the unwary.”333 A jury-default rule could greatly simplify this
the constitutional right to a jury trial” in that “[t]he right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate, but the Legislature may authorize trial by a jury of a less number than twelve in
courts inferior to the District Court, and may by general law authorize a verdict in civil cases
in any court by not less than five-sixths of the jury” (quoting NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 6)).
329 James A. Pike & Henry G. Fisher, Pleadings and the Jury Rights in the New Federal
Procedure, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 645, 647 (1940).
330 See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 10 (2008) (arguing that in formulating default rules,
“[t]here is . . . no way of avoiding nudging in some direction, and whether intended or not,
these nudges will affect what people choose.”).
331 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, CHOOSING NOT TO CHOOSE: UNDERSTANDING THE VALUE OF
CHOICE 7 (2015) (discussing that effect of default rules on low information actors).
332 See FED. R. CIV. P. 81(c)(3) (requiring that, in removed actions, “[a] party who, before
removal, expressly demanded a jury trial in accordance with state law need not renew the
demand after removal,” but “[i]f the state law did not require an express demand for a jury
trial, a party need not make one after removal unless the court orders the parties to do so”;
and going on to require that “[i]f all necessary pleadings have been served at the time of
removal,” a party must demand a jury trial “within 14 days after it files a notice of removal”
or “it is served with a notice of removal,” with failure to do so resulting in waiver).
333 9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
2334 (4th ed. 2022) (collecting judicial criticisms of Rule 81(c)); see also Susan M. Halpern,
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process, ensuring litigants that they can readily receive a federal
jury trial regardless of the status of the case at the time of removal.
While those scholars who have studied the jury-default proposal
differ on their conclusions as to the degree that the proposal would
increase the number of jury trials, basic economics suggest it would
have at least some positive impact.334
But even if reverting to the original rule failed to substantially
increase the number of jury trials, it is still a worthwhile proposal
for its symbolic significance. Procedural rules reflect the virtues of
the societies that adopt them.335 The current jury-waiver rule
reflects the erroneous notion that common law courts can largely
operate at their full potential without the democratic insights of the
governed. It suggests to litigants and the society more generally
that the civil jury is but one of many options for dispute resolution,
rather than a central and favored component of the constitutional
structure. Justice Gorsuch and Judge Graber are correct in
suggesting that readopting a jury-default rule “honors the Seventh
Amendment more fully.”336 The rule would better reflect the
systemic value and virtue of the jury as a nonexpendable part of the
American system of government, and it would nudge litigants
toward that socially desirable outcome.
2. Remove Damage Caps. Another tool to lower barriers to the use
of civil juries, so that they may once again serve their emboldening
sociopolitical role, is to remove statutorily imposed restrictions on
their fact-finding—specifically, damage caps. The Supreme Court
has made it clear that a damage calculation is a fact reserved for
Federal Rule 81(c) and Jury Demand in a Removed Action: A Procedural Trap for the Unwary,
47 ALA. L. REV. 623, 638 (1983) (discussing how the result of this rule is “widespread judicial
inconsistency” and that litigants unaware of the rule “unintentionally waive[] their right to
a jury”); see also Richard Lorren Jolly, Toward A Civil Jury-Trial Default Rule, 67 DEPAUL
L. REV. 685, 695 (2018) (discussing the complexity of Rule 81(c)(3) and the different
approaches taken by circuit courts in addressing it).
334 Compare Jolly, supra note 333, at 694 (arguing that a jury-trial default is unlikely to
result in substantially more jury trials), with David Crump, A Response to the Jury Default
Proposal: Court Dockets, Jury Trials, and Finding the Best Solution, 38 REV. LITIG. 239, 241–
43 (2019) (arguing that the change is likely to substantially increase the number of jury
trials).
335 See, e.g., JOHN P. DAWSON, A HISTORY OF LAY JUDGES 1 (1960) (arguing that the
structure and organization of courts are influenced by, among other things, “the alternative
or competing means by which group decisions could be made,” and that these “are a product
and a reflection of many forces in society”).
336 GORSUCH & GRABER, supra note 322, at 73.
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the jury’s determination.337 Allowing legislatures and judges to
displace jurors in that fact-finding role has dramatic consequences
as to the practicable ability for some litigants to bring certain causes
of action.
As the Diamond-Salerno study previously cited shows, artificial
caps on damages undermine the availability of jury trials by
changing the “practical and economic realities of mounting a jury
trial.”338 When a plaintiff’s attorney must finance the costs of the
litigation and take into account the uncertainty of a return on the
investment for both the client and counsel’s time,339 as one Texas
lawyer colorfully put it: “You’re talking about a lot of money, and—
in other words—it makes the juice not worth the squeeze.”340
Restricting the authority of civil jurors effectively restricts entire
causes of action.
Noneconomic damage caps make it particularly problematic to
move forward in a legitimate case for those who are unlikely to have
significant lost wages or income that might ameliorate a cap’s
effect.341 As a result, retirees, children, full-time caregivers, and
those living in poverty may be unable to seek compensation in states
with capped damages because the litigation’s costs will often exceed
See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc. 532 U.S. 424, 437 (2001) (noting
that “the measure of actual damages suffered . . . presents a question of historical or
predictive fact” within the province of the jury); see also St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co.
v. Craft, 237 U.S. 648, 661 (1915) (holding that the amount of damages to be awarded is “only
a question of fact” and is within the power, duty, and responsibility of the lower court).
338 Diamond & Salerno, supra note 155, at 144.
339 The contingency fee embodies this approach to financing litigation, in which the lawyers’
services and expenses will only be collected if the client prevails. See City of Burlington v.
Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 561 (1992) (“Under the most common contingent-fee contract for
litigation, the attorney receives no payment for his services if his client loses.”). For most
potential plaintiffs who lack the means to self-finance litigation, the contingency fee is their
“key to the courthouse.” See, e.g., Sneed v. Sneed, 681 P.2d 754, 756 (Okla. 1984)
(“[C]ontingent fees are still the poor man’s key to the courthouse door [and] allows persons
who could not otherwise afford to assert their claims to have their day in [c]ourt.” (footnote
omitted)); Philip H. Corboy, Contingency Fees: The Individual’s Key to the Courthouse Door,
2 LITIG. 27, 28 (1976) (“[The plaintiff] must obtain representation without a requirement that
he pay for it out of already depleted recourses.”).
340 Daniels & Martin, supra note 222, at 660.
341 In some states, however, damage caps limit total damages—economic and
noneconomic—and may not even compensate fully for medical expenses caused by the
tortious conduct. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-64-302 (2005); IND. CODE § 34-18-14-3
(2017); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1231.2 (2015); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2825 (2014); VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (2011).
337
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the potential recovery.342 The cap also discriminates against groups
that have historically received lesser wages because of their gender
or minority status, rendering their noneconomic damages a larger
proportion of their compensatory damages.343 As Professor Lucinda
Finley contends in discussing those she calls “the hidden victims of
tort reform”: “[W]omen, minorities, and the poor receive lesser
amounts of economic loss compensation than more economically
well off white men,” and “wage projection data . . . are explicitly race
and gender based, building on the assumption that past race and
gender wage disparities will remain ensconced in the future.”344
Damage caps exacerbate social inequality in the courthouse.
The simple solution to these problems is to repeal the caps345 and
thereby restore the civil jury’s constitutional authority over factfinding. This would not destroy the economy as some pro-business
interests have argued.346 Damage caps have not been shown to have
any positive effect on, for instance, the availability or affordability
of health care—the most frequent justification offered by their
proponents.347 Instead, damage caps create significant obstacles to
jury trials and access to the courts. Their removal could thus
increase the number of jury trials and, what is more, reflect a trust

342 See Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform: Women, Children, and the
Elderly, 53 EMORY L.J. 1263, 1265, 1305 (2004) (discussing disparate impacts resulting from
damages caps).
343 Id. at 1280.
344 Id.
345 Courts are split on whether damage caps in common-law causes of action violate
constitutional jury trial guarantees. Compare Hilburn v. Enerpipe Ltd., 442 P.3d 509, 524
(Kan. 2019) (“Regardless of whether an existing damages cap is technically or theoretically
applied as a matter of law, the cap’s effect is to disturb the jury’s finding of fact on the amount
of the award. Allowing this substitutes the Legislature’s nonspecific judgment for the jury’s
specific judgment.”), with Siebert v. Okun, 485 P.3d 1265, 1277 (N.M 2021) (holding that,
once a jury “returns a verdict based on its factual findings,” the “legal consequence of that
verdict is a matter of law, which the Legislature has the authority to shape [by reducing
damages to a statutory limit]”).
346 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
347 See, e.g., BERNARD S. BLACK, DAVID A. HYMAN, MYUNGHO PAIK, WILLIAM M. SAGE &
CHARLES SILVER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION 211–23 (2021) (finding no evidence that
damage caps positively affect physician supply); Myungho Paik, Bernard Black & David A.
Hyman, Damage Caps and the Labor Supply of Physicians: Evidence from the Third Reform
Wave, 18 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 463, 463 (2016) (same); David A. Hyman, Charles M. Silver, &
Bernard S. Black & Myungho Paik, Does Tort Reform Affect Physician Supply? Evidence from
Texas, 42 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 203, 217 (2015) (same).
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in Americans to govern themselves fairly, while keeping with
constitutional principles.
3. Expand Procedural Experimentation. Restoring the jury to its
position within the constitutional structure does not require
pretending that nothing has changed since 1791. Another way to
revive civil jury trials is to expand the use of alternative procedural
tracks, such as expedited jury trials, which allow speedy access to
community input, as well as remote or virtual jury trials, as
solutions to the current public health crisis.348 Such
experimentation, however, should only be widely adopted if it can
maintain the key benefits of lay judicial participation. As the
Supreme Court has recognized, “[N]otions of what a proper jury is
have developed in harmony with our basic concepts of a democratic
society and a representative government.”349 Any experimentation
must live up to those motivating concepts.
Consider first expedited jury trial projects, which offer an
alluring solution for bringing the public back into the jury box.
Courts have recognized that for some litigants, the time and cost of
a full civil jury trial can be prohibitive, deterring them from
exercising their right to seek community judgment of their
disputes.350 In the 1990s, states around the country began to
address the problem by experimenting with expedited jury trials.351
These alternative trial procedures offer abbreviated jury trials
designed to resolve factually and legally straightforward cases with
lower-value damages quickly, often in a single day.352 The specifics
of these procedures differ meaningfully among jurisdictions, though
they often involve a trial before fewer than twelve jurors, mandatory

348 See, e.g., Robert A. Patterson, Reviving the Civil Jury Trial: Implementing Short,
Summary, and Expedited Trial Programs, 2014 BYU L. REV. 951, 951 (discussing how
expedited jury trials can be a means of reviving civil jury trials).
349 Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 85 (1942).
350 See Patterson, supra note 348, at 960 (stating that expedited jury trials are attempts at
making the process speedier and less expensive).
351 See PAULA L. HANNAFORD-AGOR, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., SHORT, SUMMARY &
EXPEDITED: THE EVOLUTION OF CIVIL JURY TRIALS 23 (2012) (“The short trial program in the
Maricopa County Superior Court allows civil litigants to opt for a streamlined jury trial as an
alternative to mandatory arbitration or as an appeal from an unfavorable arbitration
decision.”).
352 See id. at 24 (“Most short trial cases are lower-value personal-injury cases, especially
automobile torts involving soft-tissue injuries.”).
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damage caps or high-low agreements, and the jury’s verdict may or
may not be binding on the parties.353
Make no mistake, as currently designed, these projects are not
an ideal solution to America’s democratic woes. They cut against the
full benefits of lay judicial participation by limiting the
responsibility of jurors to resolve whole factual disputes, at times
operate with as few as four jurors, and do not require unanimity.354
However, there are certain benefits. By ensuring court access and
limiting incentives to overinvest in litigation, litigants and the
judiciary receive many of the benefits of jury trials while avoiding
some of the commonly observed detriments.355 Moreover, shorter
trials may prove less of a hardship, financial and otherwise, on the
people serving as jurors, thereby allowing for a greater diversity of
voices to be represented.356 And if the programs were modified to
require full juries of twelve—which better represent the community
and are more reliable fact-finders compared to smaller bodies—
expedited trials could prove significantly valuable in jumpstarting
the institution while not discarding the democratic and
administrative benefits of lay judicial participation.357
Another option is to explore the potential benefits of remote or
virtual civil jury trials.358 In the spring of 2020, the COVID-19
pandemic led many courts to shift to online proceedings.359 For
See generally id. (comparing expedited and summary jury trial projects around the
country).
354 See id. at 6 (citing the Maricopa County, Arizona Superior Court Short Trial Program,
which involved a four-person jury selected from a ten-person panel with a verdict requiring
only three votes).
355 See id. at 4 (noting that the short-trial programs were designed to address concerns
about “uncertainty, delay, and expense” of a typical jury trial).
356 For a discussion on how these burdens limit juror diversity, see generally Anna Offit,
Benevolent Exclusion, 96 WASH. L. REV. 613 (2021) (“[T]he routine dismissal of citizens who
face economic hardship excludes not only people but also the diversity of ideas, experiences,
and frames of interpretation that characterize the American population.”).
357 See supra Section II.B.
358 See Valerie P. Hans, Virtual Juries, 71 DEPAUL L. REV. 301, 301 (2022) [hereinafter
Hans, Virtual Juries] (examining how virtual jury trials may affect “the issues of jury
representativeness, the adequacy of virtual jury selection, the quality of decision making, and
the public’s access to jury trial proceedings”).
359 For state court perspectives on online proceedings, see NATIONAL CTR. FOR STATE CTS.,
JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVES ON ODR AND OTHER VIRTUAL COURT PROCESSES,
https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0018/42912/2020-07-27-Judicial-Perspectives002.pdf. For current federal court procedures, see Court Orders and Updates During COVID353
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many courts and lawyers, a virtual jury trial, in which jury
selection, trial proceedings, and jury deliberation are all conducted
online, was a bridge too far.360 Commentators analyzing the
prospect of virtual jury trials expressed concerns about whether the
quality of justice would be compromised.361 A small number of
courts, however, embarked on virtual jury trials, primarily in civil
cases.362 For example, as of March 2021, the Superior Court in King
County, Washington, had conducted more than 300 virtual civil
trials, including a significant number of civil jury trials.363 Courts in
Arizona, California, Florida, and Texas also have undertaken
virtual civil jury trials, with generally positive evaluations.364 As
courts reopened their buildings for business, many began to
schedule in-person jury trials (with masks and social distancing)
rather than experiment with the novel option of virtual jury trial
proceedings.365 But as we noted earlier, a substantial backlog and
continuing health issues related to COVID-19 have led to
substantial delays in scheduling civil jury trials and fraught
19 Pandemic, U.S. CTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/court-websitelinks/court-orders-and-updates-during-covid19-pandemic; see also Herbert B. Dixon, Jr.,
Pandemic Potpourri: The Legal Profession’s Rediscovery of Teleconferencing, 59 ABA JUDGES’
J. 37 (2020) (discussing the switch to virtual court proceedings).
360 See, e.g., TAYLOR BENNINGER, COURTNEY COLWELL, DEBBIE MUKAMAL & LEAH
PLACHINSKI, STANFORD CRIM. JUST. CTR., VIRTUAL JUSTICE? A NATIONAL STUDY ANALYZING
THE TRANSITION TO REMOTE CRIMINAL COURT 5–12 (2021) (expressing access to justice
concerns about remote criminal case proceedings).
361 See Susan A. Bandes & Neal Feigenson, Virtual Trials: Necessity, Invention, and the
Evolution of the Courtroom, 68 BUFFALO L. REV. 1275, 1280 (2020) (analyzing the potential
risks to justice created by the use of virtual jury trials).
362 See Sozi Tulante, Kimberly Branscome & Emily Van Tuyl, Demystifying the Virtual
Civil
Jury
Trial
Experience,
LAW360
(Apr.
29,
2021)
https://www.law360.com/articles/1379757/demystifying-the-virtual-civil-jury-trialexperience (“During the pandemic, formats of civil jury trials have varied widely, and have
included fully in-person trials—with participants maintaining social distance and wearing
personal protective equipment—as well as fully virtual trials and hybrid approaches.”).
363 See Matt Markovich, King County Court Shifts to Virtual Trials, Potentially Changing
Future of Courtrooms, KOMO NEWS (Mar. 4, 2021), https://komonews.com/news/local/kingcounty-superior-court-shifts-to-virtual-trials-chips-away-at-massive-case-backlog
(“[T]he
court has done over 300 virtual civil trials and at least eight criminal trials, all over Zoom.”).
364 See Hans, Virtual Juries, supra note 358, at 310–13 (summarizing virtual jury trial
experimentation in these courts and noting that beyond some technical issues, the cases
“proceeded well”).
365 See, e.g., Bill Rankin, Ga. Courts Try to Keep Jury Trials Going Despite COVID-19 Delta
Surge, THE ATLANTA-J. CONST. (Aug. 18, 2021) (explaining how some judges require masks
and distancing in returning to the courtroom).
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experiences when jurors, witnesses, or litigants become sick during
their trials.366
Virtual civil jury proceedings—for part or all of the trial—could
help reduce the backlog and avoid the negative health consequences
of assembling with large numbers of others during the pandemic.
Several judges who participated in virtual jury trials observed that
when jury selection was conducted virtually, and with assistance
and alternatives for those who had limited or no access to the
required technology, it appeared that the panels were as diverse or
more diverse than in-person jury selection panels.367 The
prospective jurors who participated in virtual jury selection
expressed overall favorable reactions to the experience as well.368 Of
course, we still need to know more about how the virtual character
of the trial affects the jury’s evaluation of evidence and witnesses,
participation by jurors who lack their own remote access, and the
robustness of the jury deliberation.
If we take care to implement these procedural innovations in a
way that ensures representative and high-quality citizen
participation, the benefits may outweigh the detriments. Put
simply, having some jury trials is better than having no jury trials.
And given the ongoing impact of COVID-19, expedited or virtual
jury trials could provide methods for managing the backlog of civil
cases in a way that provides some, albeit a more limited, space for
community involvement. Expedited jury trials provide a way to
address the concerns of those litigants who, correctly or incorrectly,
believe that even during non-pandemic times that jury trials are too
slow, risky, and expensive.369 And virtual jury trials offer a safer
way to give voice to the community in the resolution of societal
disputes during a pandemic. Critically, in our view, until we are
assured that these alternative procedures do not compromise
justice, they should be optional and not forced on those litigants who
desire traditional jury trial procedures.

See supra notes 46–49 and accompanying text.
See Hans, Virtual Juries, supra note 358, at 310–13 (reporting judges’ favorable
observations about jury panel diversity in virtual proceedings).
368 See id. at 311 (concluding that “[o]n the whole, participants gave positive feedback about
the experience”).
369 Diamond & Salerno, supra note 155, at 121 (discussing the “risk, costs, and delay”
associated with jury trials).
366
367
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B. PROMOTING FAIR AND ACCURATE JURY FACT-FINDING

To better realize the democratic promise of the civil jury, the
institution itself must be a desirable form of dispute resolution. If
litigants do not trust jurors, they will avoid them in favor of
alternative arbiters and venues. As such, in order to revitalize the
jury, strategies for increasing the already strong fairness and
accuracy of jury fact-finding should be adopted. The following
research-based recommendations can help make litigants more
confident in the outcomes of their disputes while also ensuring that
the jury as an institution continues to fulfill its constitutionally
anticipated sociopolitical role.
1. Ensure Representative Juries. The jury that decides a civil trial
is drawn from a jury venire, ideally one that constitutes a
representative cross-section of the community. Earlier we discussed
the multiple benefits of representative juries.370 Our laws do not
guarantee a representative trial jury, but they do require courts to
assemble representative venires from which those juries are
picked.371 Even so, in many jurisdictions, jury venires still fall short
of fully reflecting the community.372 And the COVID-19 pandemic
has made summoning a representative cross-section of the
population even more challenging. This is disturbing considering
that diverse juries engage in more robust and thorough factfinding.373 Vigorous deliberation can give voice to people with
differing perspectives to debate their views and arrive at a verdict
that incorporates multiple perspectives in the community. Perhaps

See supra Section II.B.
See NANCY GERTNER, JUDITH H. MIZNER & JOSHUA DUBIN, THE LAW OF JURIES 34–35
(11th ed. 2020) (“First, litigants have the right to grand and petit juries selected at random
from a fair cross-section of the community in the district or division where the court sits.
Second, all citizens have the opportunity to be considered for service on grand and petit juries
and have the obligation to serve as jurors when summoned.”).
372 See, e.g., VALERIE P. HANS, POUND CIV. JUST. INST., CHALLENGES TO ACHIEVING
FAIRNESS IN CIVIL JURY SELECTION 7–12 (2021) [hereinafter HANS, CHALLENGES TO
ACHIEVING FAIRNESS], https://www.poundinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/2021Pound-Forum-Paper-Valerie-Hans.pdf. (summarizing evidence of failures to achieve jury
representativeness in civil jury trial); Shari Seidman Diamond & Valerie P. Hans, Fair
Juries, U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming) (examining causes of the lack of representativeness in
jury trials).
373 See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
370
371
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for that reason, diverse juries are seen as more legitimate.374
Therefore, we urge courts to take multiple steps to modify jury
selection procedures to ensure the fullest possible community
representation.
Multiple reasons for underrepresentation call for multiple
remedies.375 The first place to begin is the sources of the names of
community residents that courts use to generate master jury lists.
Information collected by the National Center for State Courts
(NCSC) shows that states use diverse sources to populate their
master jury lists.376 Even today, some jurisdictions rely upon a
single source list such as the voters list, or combine multiple lists
that still fall short of fully including the jury-eligible population.377
The results are jury pools that are less than fully reflective of the
community.378 One of the most important ways to promote fuller
representation is to use multiple source lists. Doing so has been
identified as “perhaps the most significant step” that courts can use
to maximize the representativeness of the master jury list.379 But
See Leslie Ellis & Shari Siedman Diamond, Race, Diversity, and Jury Composition:
Battering and Bolstering Legitimacy, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1033, 1039 (2003) (discussing the
costs of unrepresentative juries).
375 See SHARI SEIDMAN DIAMOND, P OUND CIV. JUST. INST., JUDICIAL RULEMAKING FOR JURY
TRIAL
FAIRNESS
5–12
(2021),
https://www.poundinstitute.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/06/2021-Pound-Forum-Paper-Shari-Seidman-Diamond.pdf
(recommending actions to promote jury pool representativeness); see also Ellis & Diamond,
supra note 374 (recommending a two-pronged approach to developing impartial juries).
376 GREGORY E. MIZE, PAULA HANNAFORD-AGOR & NICOLE L. WATERS, NAT’L CTR. FOR
STATE CTS., THE STATE-OF-THE-STATES SURVEY OF JURY IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS: A
COMPENDIUM
REPORT
(2007),
https://www.ncscjurystudies.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0016/5623/soscompendiumfinal.pdf.
NCSC resources on fair cross-section law and summoning practices may be found at
https://www.ncsc-jurystudies.org/what-we-do/fair-cross-section.
377 See William Caprathe, Paula Hannaford-Agor, Stephanie McCoy Loquvam & Shari
Seidman Diamond, Assessing and Achieving Jury Pool Representativeness, 55 ABA JUDGES’
J. 16 (2016) (describing how to assess and improve representativeness of master jury lists);
see also id. at 18 (recommending that the master jury list should include at least eighty-five
percent of the jury-eligible population).
378 See VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 127, at 76–79 (2007) (describing points in the jury
selection process that contribute to decreases in jury representativeness); HANS, CHALLENGES
TO ACHIEVING FAIRNESS, supra note 372, at 11–12 (describing a study that found how
nonresponses to jury qualification questionaries and summonses threatened representative
jury venires).
379 Paula Hannaford-Agor, Systematic Negligence in Jury Operations: Why the Definition
of Systematic Exclusion in Fair Cross Section Claims Must Be Expanded, 59 DRAKE L. REV.
761, 780 (2011).
374
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the efforts should not stop there. Courts need to continually update
their master lists, at least annually, recognizing that a significant
number of residents regularly move into and out of the
jurisdiction.380
Representativeness is also affected by nonresponse to the jury
summons.381 Perhaps the most common reason for this is that the
jury summons was never received in the mail.382 However, at least
some of the nonresponse is likely due to people’s reluctance to
participate as jurors. And the COVID-19 pandemic has introduced
new challenges to courts that attempt to seat fully representative
juries, whether they are traditional in-person jury trials or remote
virtual jury trials.383 Multiple follow-ups to jury summonses have
been shown to reduce the nonresponse rate.384 Something as simple
as a follow-up postcard sent within a few weeks of the initial
nonresponse significantly increases the likelihood of the citizen
responding.385 Some reformers have also proposed redesigning the
jury summons with messaging that stresses the positive and
emboldening aspects of jury service, rather than the punitive results
that may flow from a failure to respond, as a way to increase yield
rates.386 A jury will only be as diverse as the venire from which it is
chosen.
As for in-court jury selection, the voir dire process in which
prospective jurors are questioned about whether they can be fair
and impartial jurors also affects jury representativeness. Evidence
that attorneys in both civil and criminal cases exercise their
peremptory challenges along racial lines has led some states to take
380 See Caprathe et al., supra note 377, at 18 (“The master jury list should be updated at
least annually”).
381 See id. at 19 (“Nonresponse and FTA [(Failure to Appear)] rates contribute to
underrepresentation of minorities in the jury pool.”).
382 See id. at 18 (noting that “12 percent of jury-related mailings are returned by [the United
States Postal Service] as undeliverable”).
383 See HANS, CHALLENGES TO ACHIEVING FAIRNESS, supra note 372, at 13 (describing how
health problems and access to technology may undermine jury pool representativeness).
384 See Caprathe et al., supra note 377, at 19 (“[T]he most effective post-hoc strategy for
minimizing nonresponse/FTA rates is a second notice/second summons program.”).
385 See id. (“The most effective follow-up programs are those that follow up within three
weeks after the person’s nonresponse/FTA and that are consistently administered.”).
386 See D.C. JURY PROJECT COMM., JURY SERVICE REVISITED: UPGRADES FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY, COUNCIL FOR CT. EXCELLENCE 9 (2015) (“The DC Jury Project believes that if
positive reinforcement is provided[,] . . . a greater percentage of jurors will be eager to serve
in the future . . . .”).
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innovative approaches, ranging from California’s387 and
Washington State’s388 new strategies for handling potentially racebased peremptory challenges, to Arizona’s elimination of
peremptory challenges entirely.389 These states will serve as
laboratories, allowing scholars and policy makers to examine the
extent to which such innovations affect justice and fairness in jury
trials and to propose further strategies accordingly.
In a very real sense, although jury duty is technically obligatory,
it is more accurately seen as a voluntary activity in the court’s work.
Failing to respond to a jury summons, developing good-enough
excuses for excusal, answering questions during voir dire in such as
a way as to suggest bias—there are multiple ways that one can
avoid serving.390 So, we also need to consider developing effective
community outreach efforts that explain not only the nuts and bolts
of jury duty and what to expect, but also that emphasize the central
importance of jury service to our democracy through outreach into
the community. Some jurisdictions have begun celebrating the first
week of May as Juror Appreciation Week, with programs and
advertisements to “educat[e] the public about the judicial system,
enhance public awareness of the importance of jury service, and
appreciation to citizens who perform their civic duty”—with

387 See CA. CODE OF CIV. P. § 231.7 (2021) (establishing a procedure for reviewing exercises
of peremptory challenges requiring the party to show “by clear and convincing evidence that
an objectively reasonable person would view the rationale as unrelated to a prospective juror’s
[membership in a protected class]” and defining “objectively reasonable person” as someone
that is “aware that unconscious bias, in addition to purposeful discrimination, have resulted
in unfair exclusion of potential jurors in the State of California”).
388 See WASH. R. GEN. 37 (2018) (establishing a procedure for reviewing exercises of
peremptory challenges requiring the court to determine whether “an objective observer could
view race or ethnicity as a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge,” and defines an
“objective observer” as someone who is aware of “implicit, institutional, and unconscious
biases”).
389 Order Amending Rules 18.4 and 18.5 of The Rules of Criminal Procedure, and Rule
47(E) of The Rules of Civil Procedure, No. R-21-0020 (Ariz. Aug. 30, 2021). For a discussion
on the potential benefits associated with abolishing peremptory challenges, see generally
Hon. Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should be Abolished: A Trial Judge’s
Perspective, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 809 (1997).
390 Step-by-step instructions for “getting out of” jury service are readily available online.
See, e.g., Jacob Maslow, How to Legally Get Out of Jury Selection in 2022?, LEGAL SCOOPS
(Jan. 27, 2022), https://www.legalscoops.com/how-to-legally-get-out-of-jury-selection-in2022/.
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promising results.391 Adopting and expanding such efforts can help
increase the diversity of the summons’s yield and boost the
institution’s reputation as a democratic body.392
2. Return to Twelve-Person Civil Juries. Related to the above, the
jury’s size coincides with its ability to represent the community.
Larger juries are much better able to reflect the range of diverse
backgrounds, experiences, and viewpoints in a community.393 The
decisions that many jurisdictions have made to reduce the civil
jury’s size from the traditional number of twelve have also reduced
the ability of today’s civil juries to fully represent the local
community.394 Judge Patrick Higginbotham, Judge Lee Rosenthal,
and Professor Steven Gensler surveyed the frequency of different
jury sizes in federal district courts, discovering that in recent years
the most common size was an eight-person civil jury.395 Research on
jury size shows that there are strong reasons to recommend twelveperson juries: the decisions of larger juries are more representative,
more reliable, and less influenced by outlier juror preferences.396
An interesting study by Professor Shari Diamond and her
colleagues shows the crucial way in which the jury’s size directly

Taylor Simpson-Wood, The Rise and Fall of Bad Judge: Lady Justice Is No Tramp, 17
TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 1, 29 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also ABA
COMM’N
ON
THE
CIV.
JURY,
JUROR
APPRECIATION
KIT
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/american_jury/juror_kit_part
_1.pdf (contending that implementing Juror Appreciation Week can help to “[r]einforce public
confidence in the justice system, [i]mprove communication with jurors and employers, [and]
[d]isseminate an important and positive message to the public about jury service”).
392 See, e.g., Caprathe et al., supra note 377, at 19 (contending that “educat[ing] the public
about the consequences of failing to appear” may improve appearance rates, and higher
appearance rates “will improve the inclusiveness and representativeness” the jury pool).
393
See Jury Size: Does It Matter?, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS.,
https://www.ncsc.org/newsroom/at-the-center/2022/jury-size-does-it-matter (last visited Sept.
14 (2022) (“Smaller juries are often less diverse and less likely to accurately represent their
communities.”).
394 See Shari S. Diamond, Destiny Peery, Francis J. Dolan & Emily Dolan, Achieving
Diversity on the Jury: Jury Size and the Peremptory Challenge, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
425, 425 (2009) [hereinafter Diamond et al., Achieving Diversity] (“[J]ury size had a
substantial effect on minority representation.”).
395 See Patrick E. Higginbotham, Lee H. Rosenthal & Steven S. Gensler, Better by the
Dozen: Bringing Back the Twelve-Person Civil Jury, 104 JUDICATURE 46, 49–50 (2020)
(studying jury size in fifteen district courts during 2016–18 and finding that 61.4% of civil
juries in these district courts were eight-person juries).
396 See id. at 51–53 (summarizing the empirical research).
391
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affects its ability to fully represent the community.397 Observing the
use of peremptory challenges and jury composition in 277 Chicagoarea civil juries of different sizes, Professor Diamond and her
collaborators found that peremptory challenges by both sides were
associated with prospective jurors’ race. Defense attorneys
challenged more black prospective jurors, whereas plaintiffs’
attorneys challenged fewer black jurors.398 The patterns of their
challenges offset, so that the overall jury pool’s composition were
not significantly affected by the race-based peremptory
challenges.399 However, the jury’s size was significantly related to
its representativeness.400 Just two percent of the twelve-person
juries had no black members, while twenty-eight percent of the sixperson juries had no black members.401 The authors concluded that
the “change most likely to promote diversity on the jury is a return
to the jury of 12.”402
In addition to its positive effect on jury representativeness,
research also documents the superior fact-finding ability of larger
juries. It is said that “[t]welve heads are better than one”; and
empirical jury research confirms that insight.403 So too does ancient
wisdom. As Aristotle explained:
Taken individually, any one of these people is
presumably inferior to the best person. But a city
consists of many people, just like a feast to which many
contribute, and is better than one that is one and
simple. This is why a mob can also judge many things
better than any single individual.404

397 See Diamond et al., Achieving Diversity, supra note 394, at 449 (showing that jury size
is more significant than exercises of peremptory challenges in jury diversity).
398 See id. at 440 (“Plaintiffs removed fewer blacks, fewer females, and wealthier jurors; in
stark contrast, defense attorneys removed more blacks and poorer jurors.”).
399 See id. at 436 (describing a “tiny” effect).
400 See id. at 443 (noting the “precipitous drop” in representation when jury size decreases).
401 Id. at 442 tbl.6.
402 Id. at 426.
403 Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better Than One?, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
205 (1989). For empirical research on jury size, see Hans, The Power of Twelve, supra note
124, at 8 (summarizing research); Higginbotham et al., supra note 395, at 51–54
(summarizing arguments and evidence in favor of larger jury size).
404 ARISTOTLE, POLITICS bk. III § 1286(a) at 77 (C.D.C. Reeve trans., Hackett Publ’g Co.
2017) (c. 384 B.C.E.)).
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In short, jurors are clearly “better by the dozen.”405
A final point in favor of larger juries is that jury service
encourages civic engagement and the legal system’s legitimacy.406
As Judge Higginbotham and his colleagues note: “In this era of
declining jury-trial rates, we should fill every jury chair we can,
every chance we get. Every empty jury chair is a missed opportunity
to strengthen the bonds between the people and the courts.”407 Yet
many jurisdictions use juries of six or eight persons, even for high
profile and significant civil cases.408 The original motivation was
undoubtedly one of efficiency, coupled with the belief that smaller
juries were likely to be quite similar to larger juries in their factfinding.409 Smaller juries cost somewhat less to manage; fewer
community members need to be summoned; and the total amounts
paid out in juror fees are lower.410 But the modest time savings and
logistical benefits that might accrue from smaller juries are
outweighed by the increased representativeness and the superior
fact-finding of twelve-person juries, which has now been welldocumented.411 The dramatic declines that we have noted in civil
jury trials suggest that whatever savings might have accrued
previously from the use of smaller juries is likely even more modest
today.412
Judge Higginbotham and his colleagues propose one immediate
solution for the federal courts. They suggest that federal judges use
405 There is some judicial appetite at the Supreme Court for returning to twelve-person
juries, at least in the criminal context. See Khorrami v. Arizona, No. 21-1553, 2022 WL
16726030, at *1 (Nov. 7, 2022) (Gorsuch, J. dissenting from the denial of certiorari)
(“[Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), upholding the use of six-person criminal juries,]
was wrong the day it was decided, it remains wrong today, and it impairs both the integrity
of the American criminal justice system and the liberties of those who come before our
Nation’s Courts.”).
406 See supra Section II.B.2.
407 Higginbotham et al., supra note 395, at 53.
408 See id. at 47, 50 (recounting the small jury size in the cases with the largest damage
awards in federal courts in 2019 and identifying that “four out of every five civil juries begin[s]
with nine or fewer members”).
409 See, e.g., ERICA J. BOYCE, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., TIME TO REFLECT: HAS THE
RESEARCH CHANGED REGARDING THE IMPORTANCE OF JURY SIZE? 3 (2021) (discussing the
arguments and evidence about the cost effectiveness of smaller juries).
410 See id. (examining and challenging arguments on cost effectiveness of smaller juries).
411 Higginbotham et al., supra note 395, at 53 (“Larger juries are better than smaller juries
in ways important to the process and the product.”).
412 See BOYCE, supra note 409, at 3 (examining and then challenging prior research on cost
effectiveness of smaller juries).
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their discretion to seat twelve-person juries, pointing out that Rule
48 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows judges latitude in
the size of the civil jury that will hear the case: “A jury must begin
with at least 6 and no more than 12 members . . . .”413 Judges need
not obtain agreement from the parties to seat larger juries.414 The
preferences of litigants, while certainly important, should not be
given automatic priority over the systemic interests of the court’s
legitimacy.415 In some state courts, judges may have no discretion if
state court rules specify civil juries of a particular size.416 We urge
the legal community and lawmakers to act now to change laws,
rules, and practices to once again mandate twelve-person civil
juries. A change to larger juries is a straightforward and effective
way to underscore a commitment to the importance of diversity and
inclusion in the legal system.
3. Adopt Active Jury Reforms. Civil jury trial procedures
currently seem to be based on an image of the jury as a quiescent,
passive group of citizens. Jurors are instructed to refrain from
talking to one another about the case and from reaching premature
conclusions until all the evidence is presented.417 At the end of
evidence presentation, the judge then instructs the jury, and the
members adjourn to the deliberation room, relying on one another’s
memories to assess the evidence and reach a decision.418 The
assumption seems to be that a passive role is essential to

See id. at 47–48 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 48(a)).
See id. at 49 (“Whether to empanel six or 12 or some number in between is a choice for
the judge to make.”).
415 See, e.g., id. at 55 (indicating that jurors “consistently say that the experience makes
them more appreciative and more trustful of the court system”)
416 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-359(A) (2022) (establishing five-person juries as the
default and only allowing twelve-person juries in special circumstances).
417 See, e.g., MASS. SUPERIOR CT. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTION COMM., MODEL CIVIL JURY
PRECHARGE 5, 8 (Oct. 1, 2021) [hereinafter MODEL CIVIL JURY PRECHARGE],
https://www.mass.gov/doc/superior-court-model-civil-jury-instructions-precharge-script-pdf
(exhorting jurors to “[a]void drawing conclusions until the end of the case” and “not discuss
the evidence . . . until you start your formal deliberations”).
418 See, e.g., MASS. SUPERIOR CT. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTION COMM., CIVIL JURY
INSTRUCTION TEMPLATE 10 (Oct. 1, 2021), https://www.mass.gov/doc/superior-court-modelcivil-jury-instructions-final-charge-script-master-template-pdf (instructing jurors to “rely on
their own memory” during deliberation).
413
414
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impartiality in the adversary system.419 Therefore, jurors asking
questions and talking to one another as the case proceeds are
discouraged or outright forbidden.420
This approach is badly mistaken. Research on jury decisionmaking confirms that although jurors may be sitting quietly, they
are actively interpreting evidence as it is presented and integrating
it into a coherent narrative of what happened in the case.421 When
we consider ways to promote high quality jury decision-making, we
need to take into account the active approach of the jury to its
decision-making task.422 By giving substantive preliminary legal
instructions at the start of the trial, jurors will know in advance the
law that they will need to apply and can help guide them to attend
to the most relevant evidence.423 Allowing jurors to take notes, pose
questions, and engage with one another in discussing the case as it
is proceeding can help jurors avoid misunderstandings and
mistakes in interpreting the evidence.424
A substantial body of research has tested these “active jury”
reforms, finding some positive effects and little-to-no negative
consequences when they are implemented.425 For instance, in a
Seventh Circuit research project examining the impact of
preliminary substantive legal instructions in jury trials, more than
eighty percent of the jurors said that hearing these instructions

419 See, e.g., B. Michael Dann, “Learning Lessons” and “Speaking Rights”: Creating
Educated and Democratic Juries, 68 IND. L.J. 1229, 1235 (1993) (summarizing the historical
development of juries through the achievement of “almost total jury passivity” in
seventeenth-century America).
420 See, e.g., MODEL CIVIL JURY PRECHARGE., supra note 417, at 8 (limiting discussion
among jurors).
421 See Dann, supra note 419, at 1242 (showing that jurors “mold information into a
plausible ‘story’ or ‘schema’” during the trial).
422 See id. (“The rate of predeliberation judgments or decisions by jurors is high.”).
423 See id. at 1249 (bemoaning the lack of preliminary instructions, which “wastes a real
opportunity to better inform the jury and improve the quality of the trial and verdict”).
424 See id. at 1265 (promoting “limited discussions of the evidence among jurors” to enhance
the quality of jury decision-making).
425 For summaries of active jury reforms and related research on their effectiveness, see
JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS 113–37 (G. Thomas Munsterman, Paula L. Hannaford-Agor & G.
Marc Whitehead eds., 2d ed. 2006); B. Michael Dann & Valerie P. Hans, Recent Evaluative
Research on Jury Trial Innovations, 41 CT. REV. 12, 12–18 (2004); Valerie P. Hans,
Empowering the Active Jury: A Genuine Tort Reform, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 39, 55–
70 (2008); Valerie P. Hans & Michael J. Saks, Improving Judge & Jury Evaluation of
Scientific Evidence, 147 DAEDALUS 164, 164–75 (2018).
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helped them better understand the case.426 Most judges and lawyers
agreed that these instructions increased the jurors’ comprehension
of the law.427 As then-Chief Judge James Holderman stated, “I have
found that preliminary instructions helped to orient the jurors to
the case and allowed the jurors to start making connections between
the evidence and the disputed issues in the case more quickly.”428
With respect to notetaking, jurors express greater satisfaction when
they are permitted to take notes; and some studies show that
notetaking leads to significant improvements in evidence
comprehension, memory, and decision-making.429 Similarly, jurors
who are permitted to ask questions of the witnesses under carefully
controlled circumstances “report feeling significantly better
informed” and say their questions clarified the evidence.430 Allowing
jurors to discuss the case throughout the trial, rather than waiting
until the deliberation, is more controversial, as some fear that jurors
might prematurely judge the case.431 Field experiments with real
jury trials in which civil juries were randomly assigned to either
allow or not allow trial discussions, however, showed no evidence of
prejudgment.432 In fact, jurors in one study noted that trial

SEVENTH CIRCUIT AMERICAN JURY PROJECT, FINAL REPORT 28 (2008),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/seventh_circuit_american_jury_project_final_re
port_0.pdf (“Over eighty percent (80%) of the jurors reported that interim statements of
counsel were helpful.”).
427 See id. at 27–28 (“Over eighty-five percent (85%) of the participating judges thought the
use of interim statements increased the jurors’ understanding and said they would permit
interim statements during trials in the future.”).
428 Id. at 28.
429 Research studies on notetaking include Lynne ForsterLee, Irwin A. Horowitz & Martin
Bourgeois, Effects of Notetaking on Verdicts and Evidence Processing in a Civil Trial, 18 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 567, 574–75 (1994); Larry Heuer & Steven D. Penrod, Juror Notetaking and
Question Asking During Trials: A National Field Experiment, 18 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 121, 135–
40 (1994); David L. Rosenhan, S. L. Eisner & R. J. Robinson, Notetaking Can Aid Juror
Recall, 18 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 53, 59–60 (1994) (identifying benefits of note taking).
430 Heuer & Penrod, supra note 429, at 142.
431 See Diamond et al., Juror Discussions, supra note 132, at 74 (noting concerns that
“jurors permitted to discuss the evidence would use the breaks during trial to arrive at
premature group decisions on verdicts before hearing all of the evidence and the
instructions”).
432 Id. at 74–76; see also Paula L. Hannaford, Valerie P. Hans & G. Thomas Munsterman,
Permitting Jury Discussions During Trial: Impact of the Arizona Reform, 24 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 359, 378 (2000) (noting that allowing earlier discussion reduces the degree of
uncertainty jurors feel at the start of deliberation).
426
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discussions with other jurors helped to correct misunderstandings
of the evidence.433
We recommend specific reforms that have been tested and vetted
in real-world cases: (1) preliminary substantive legal instructions;
(2) notetaking; (3) question asking; and (4) engaging in trial
discussions. Research with preliminary instructions in the law that
applies to the case at hand helps jurors know what legal
requirements apply as they hear trial evidence. Allowing jurors to
take notes, ask questions of witnesses under controlled
circumstances, and permitting jurors to discuss the case during trial
breaks have all proved their worth in the jurisdictions and courts
that use them. These research-based reforms can further
strengthen jury decision-making in civil cases as well as help the
civil jury cope in cases with extremely complex evidence. In doing
so, they may make the jury a more desirable form of dispute
resolution and so increase the number of jury trials.

V. CONCLUSION
The twenty-first century finds America at a dangerous crossroad.
Commitment to democratic principles is waning, and in its place is
extreme partisanship—a shift that has already resulted in multiple
instances of violence and death across the country. The future of
American democracy is in greater peril than we have ever
experienced in our lifetimes, and it is coinciding with the nation’s
slow emergence from the ravages of a life-changing and deadly
pandemic. As strategies are adopted and efforts are made to redirect
the Republic back toward its liberal commitments, the civil jury
should not be overlooked as a meaningful locus of democratic action
and power.
While the institution has been subject to criticism and successful
attacks over the last hundred years, which have driven it to a minor
role in the judiciary today, the institution’s sociopolitical importance
and potential have not dissipated. Jury service still provides a
forum for public participation and grassroots governance, which
since the Founding has been recognized as just as important as
voting, if not more so, in maintaining the Republic. The history of
and current procedures designed to exclude the populace from this
meaningful form of public participation must be scrutinized and, as
433

Diamond et al., Juror Discussions, supra note 132, at 74–75.
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necessary, removed to restore the institution. William Blackstone
warned nearly two and a half centuries ago of “secret machinations,
which may sap and undermine [the jury]” and cautioned that no
matter how “convenient these may appear at first . . . delays and
little inconveniences in the forms of justice, are the price that all
free nations must pay for their liberty.”434 Americans should heed
these words now more than ever.
The six jury recommendations offered here can help America
back on the path toward democratic renewal. Simple changes can
be adopted to remove barriers to jury trials, making them more
likely to occur when the parties desire them. And efforts can be
made to ensure that jurors are given the tools necessary to reach
more often fair and accurate resolutions of those disputes with
which they are presented. Creative thinking and other strategies,
too, might be motivated toward these ends.435 Deliberate action
must be taken to ensure that the promise of the Seventh
Amendment is maintained, and that lay judicial participation is
restored to its central role in our judiciary, our democratic spirit,
and our governance structure.

BLACKSTONE, supra note 62, at *349.
See e.g., Christopher T. Robertson & Michael Shammas, The Jury Trial Reinvented, 9
TEX. A&M L. REV. 109, 110, 146–48 (2021) (proposing a number of radical recommendations
such as a national jury pool for national civil cases and vote-aggregation without
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alongside judges); Caren Myers Morrison, Jury 2.0, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1579, 1625–26 (2006)
(arguing in favor of a more empowered and active decision-making role for the jury); Akhil
Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1169, 1178,
1186–87 (1995) (offering a number of reforms including limiting the opportunities for
individuals to be excused from service and increasing social education about the institution).
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